BAR BULLETIN
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Rodeo Ready, by Barry Schwartz (see page 3) www.flickr.com/photos/barryabq

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Meetings

September

22
Natural Resources, Energy and Environmental Section BOD,
Noon, teleconference

23
Immigration Law Section BOD,
Noon, State Bar Center

27
Intellectual Property Law Section BOD,
Noon, Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie, Albuquerque

27
Senior Lawyers Division BOD,
4 p.m., State Bar Center

29
Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution Committee,
1 p.m., Second Judicial District Court, Third Floor Conference Room, Albuquerque

October

4
Bankruptcy Law Section,
Noon, U.S. Bankruptcy Court

4
Health Law Section,
9 a.m., teleconference

Workshops and Legal Clinics

September

21
Family Law Clinic
10 a.m.–1 p.m., Second Judicial District Court, Albuquerque, 1-877-266-9861

21
Common Legal Issues for Senior Citizens Workshop
Workshop: 10–11:15 a.m. POA AHCD Clinic: noon–1 p.m., Bosque Farms Senior Center, Bosque Farms, 1-800-876-6657

26
Common Legal Issues for Senior Citizens Workshop
Workshop: 10–11:15 a.m. POA AHCD Clinic: noon–1 p.m., Bonnie Dallas Senior Center, Farmington, 1-800-876-6657

28
Consumer Debt/Bankruptcy Workshop
6–9 p.m., State Bar Center, Albuquerque, 505-797-6094

October

5
Divorce Options Workshop
6–8 p.m., State Bar Center, Albuquerque, 505-797-6003

About the Cover Image: *Rodeo Ready*
Barry Schwartz photographs what he sees in daily life to bring out the unusual beauty of usual things. He especially likes shooting older buildings and businesses, salvage yards, ghost towns and cemeteries to preserve the beauty and ruggedness of the past. He uses angles, colors, lighting, shapes and shadows to bring out the uniqueness and beauty. Schwartz is a member of the Albuquerque Enchanted Lens Camera Club, which has been a great help with his photography. A summary of his photography is available at www.flickr.com/photos/barryabq.

Notices

Court News

Supreme Court of New Mexico Board of Bar Examiners

Reciprocal Admission Grows

The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico has added four new states to the list of jurisdictions with which our bar shares reciprocal admission: New Jersey, New York, North Carolina and West Virginia. The number of states to which experienced New Mexico attorneys may apply without taking the bar exam is now 36, plus the District of Columbia. For more information on reciprocal admission, including links to other states' requirements, visit www.nmexam.org/reciprocity/.

New Mexico Compilation Commission

'Criminal and Traffic Law Manual' Now Available

The New Mexico Compilation Commission announces the availability of the official *2016 New Mexico Criminal and Traffic Law Manual*. In addition to a new lighter weight, exclusive to this official version are the section numbers of new or amended statutes from the official *New Mexico Statutes Annotated 1978*, a table of sections affected by 2016 legislation and Chapter 30, NMSA 1978 Table of Chargeable Criminal Offenses. Pertinent official NMRA excerpts from the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Evidence, and Forms across courts are included. Order by calling 505-827-4821 or 866-240-6550. The cost is $31 for private practitioners and $29 for government attorneys.

New Mexico Court of Appeals

Notice of Retirements

Court of Appeals Chief Judge Michael E. Vigil announces two retirements: Hon. Michael D. Bustamante on Oct. 31 and the Hon. Roderick T. Kennedy on Nov. 30. A Judicial Nominating Commission will be convened in Santa Fe on Dec. 1 to interview applicants for the vacancy of Judge Bustamante. A second Judicial Nominating Commission will be convened later in December to interview applicants for the Judge Kennedy vacancy. Further information on the application process can be found at http://lawschool.unm.edu/judsel/index.php. Look for updates regarding these vacancies in the fall.

Professionalism Tip

Judge's Preamble

As a judge, I will strive to ensure that judicial proceedings are fair, efficient and conducive to the ascertainment of the truth. In order to carry out that responsibility, I will comply with the letter and spirit of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and I will ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted with fitting dignity and decorum.

Second Judicial District Court

Exhibit Destruction

Pursuant to 1.21.2.6.17 Records Retention and Disposition Schedules-Exhibits, the Second Judicial District Court will destroy exhibits filed with the Court, the Domestic Matters/Relations and Domestic Violence cases for the years of 1999–2002 including but not limited to cases which have been consolidated. Cases on appeal are excluded. Counsel for parties are advised that exhibits may be retrieved through Oct. 1. Individuals who have cases with exhibits should verify exhibit information with the Special Services Division, at 505-841-6717, from 8 a.m.–5 p.m., Monday–Friday. Plaintiff's exhibits will be released to counsel of record for the plaintiff(s) and defendant's exhibits will be released to counsel of record for defendants(s) by Order of the Court. All exhibits will be released in their entirety. Exhibits not claimed by the allotted time will be considered abandoned and will be destroyed by order of the Court.

Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court

Mediation's 30th Anniversary Celebration

Members of the legal community and the public are cordially invited to a reception celebrating Metro Court's Mediation Division's 30th year of operation. The event will take place from 5:30-7:30 p.m. on Oct. 13 in Metro Court's Rotunda. Join the court as it takes a look back: honoring those who spearheaded the program, recognizing those who have given countless hours to the program's mission and reflecting on the invaluable service mediation provides to the community. For more information, contact Camille Baca at 505-841-9897.

U.S. District Court, District of New Mexico

Magistrate Judge Appointment

The Judicial Conference of the U.S. has authorized the appointment of a full-time U.S. magistrate judge for the District of New Mexico at Las Cruces. The current annual salary of the position is $186,852. The term of office is eight years. The full public notice and application forms for the magistrate judge position are posted in the U.S. District Court Clerk's Office of all federal courthouses in New Mexico, and on the Court's website at www.nmd.uscourts.gov. Application forms may also be obtained by calling 575-528-1439. Applications must be received by Sept. 30. All applications will be kept confidential unless the applicant consents to disclosure.

Proposed Amendments to Local Rules of Criminal Procedure

Proposed amendments to the Local Rules of Criminal Procedure of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico are being considered. The proposed amendments apply to D.N.M.LR-Cr. 32, Sentencing and Judgment. A "redlined" version (with proposed additions underlined and proposed deletions stricken out) and a clean version of these proposed amendments are posted on the Court's website at www.nmd.uscourts.gov. Members of the bar may submit comments by email to localrules@nmcourt.fed.us or by mail to U.S. District Court, Clerk's Office, Pete V. Domenici U.S. Courthouse, 333 Lomas Blvd. NW, Suite 270, Albuquerque, NM 87102, Attn: Local Rules. Comments must be submitted by Sept. 30.

Reappointment of Incumbent United States Magistrate Judge

The current term of office of U.S. Magistrate Judge Gregory B. Wormuth is due to expire on May 17, 2017. The U.S. District Court is required by law to establish a panel of citizens to consider the reappointment of the magistrate judge to a new eight-year term. The duties of a magistrate judge in this court include the following: (1) conducting most preliminary proceedings in criminal cases, (2) trial and disposition of misdemeanor cases, (3) conducting various pretrial matters and evidentiary proceedings on delegation from a district judge, and (4) trial and

disposition of civil cases upon consent of the litigants. Comments from members of the bar and the public are invited as to whether the incumbent magistrate judge should be recommended by the panel for reappointment by the court and should be addressed as follows: U.S. District Court, CONFIDENTIAL—ATTN: Magistrate Judge Merit Selection Panel, 333 Lomas Blvd. NW, Suite 270, Albuquerque, NM 87102. Comments must be received by Oct. 28.

State Bar News

Attorney Support Groups

- Oct. 3, 5:30 p.m.
  First United Methodist Church, 4th and Lead SW, Albuquerque (group meets the first Monday of the month.)
- Oct. 10, 5:30 p.m.
  UNM School of Law, 1117 Stanford NE, Albuquerque, King Room in the Law Library (group meets on the second Monday of the month). Teleconference participation is now available. Dial 1-866-640-4044 and enter code 7976003#.
- Oct. 17, 7:30 a.m.
  First United Methodist Church, 4th and Lead SW, Albuquerque (group meets the third Monday of the month.)

For more information, contact Hilary Noskin, 505-449-7984 or Bill Stratvert, 505-242-6845.

Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution Committee

APD/Community Relations Presentation

The City of Albuquerque ADR Office has been tasked with multiple roles in the ongoing effort to improve relations between APD and the community. The ADR Committee and ADR Coordinator and Assistant City Attorney Tyson Hummell invite members of the legal community to attend the presentation from noon-1 p.m., Oct. 27, at the Second Judicial District Court 3rd Floor Conference Room. The presentation will explore two fundamental aspects of this effort: the previous year-long Albuquerque Collaborative on Police Community Relations and the ongoing Officer/Civilian Mediation Program. There will be ample time for questions and discussion. Attendees should expect an interactive session. R.S.V.P. with Breanna Henley at bhenley@nmbar.org. Lunch is provided. The ADR Committee will meet following the presentation from 1-1:30 p.m.

Appellate Practice Section

Appellate Pro Bono Program

The Appellate Practice Section has launched an appellate pro bono program that will match volunteer attorneys with qualifying pro se litigants in appeals assigned to the Court of Appeals general calendar. The Volunteer Attorney Program of New Mexico Legal Aid will manage the process of assembling a panel of volunteer lawyers and matching lawyers with specific cases. Those interested in learning about and possibly accepting appellate pro bono opportunities should contact Section Chair Edward Ricco at ericco@rodey.com or 505-768-7314.

Business Law Section

Nominations Open for 2016 Business Lawyer of the Year

The Business Law Section has opened nominations for its annual Business Lawyer of the Year award, to be presented on Nov. 18 after the Section's Business Law Institute CLE. Nominees should demonstrate professionalism and integrity, superior legal service, exemplary service to the Section or to business law in general, and service to the public. Self-nominations are welcome. A complete description of the award and selection criteria are available at www.nmbar.org/BusinessLaw. The deadline for nominations is Oct. 3. Send nominations to Breanna Henley at bhenley@nmbar.org. Recent recipients include Leonard Sanchez, John Salazar, Dylan O'Reilly and Susan McCormack.

Historical Committee

Jewish History in New Mexico

Long before statehood in 1912, Jewish settlers made their homes in all corners of the high desert. Along the way, community members built institutions that influenced many New Mexico communities. Join Naomi Sandweiss, author of Jewish Albuquerque and past President of the New Mexico Jewish Historical Society, from noon-1 p.m., Oct. 14, at the State Bar Center to learn more about the rich history of Jewish involvement in New Mexico and some of the fascinating personalities who participated. Lunch will be available at 11:30 a.m. R.S.V.P. with Breanna Henley at bhenley@nmbar.org.

Natural Resources, Energy and Environmental Law Section

Nominations Open for 2016 Lawyer of the Year Award

The Natural Resources, Energy and Environmental Law Section will recognize an NREEL Lawyer of the Year during its annual meeting of membership, which will be held in conjunction with the Section's CLE on Dec. 16. The award will recognize an attorney who, within his or her practice and location, is the model of a New Mexico natural resources, energy or environmental lawyer. More detailed criteria and nomination instructions are available at www.nmbar.org/NREEL. Nominations should be submitted by Oct. 28 to Breanna Henley, bhenley@nmbar.org.

Paralegal Division

Criminal Law/Civil Liabilities CLE

The State Bar Paralegal Division invites members of the legal community to at-

tend the Division's Criminal Law/Civil Liabilities CLE program (3.0 G) from 9 a.m.–12:15 p.m., Sept. 24, at the State Bar Center. Topics include the unauthorized practice of law and increasing liabilities for paralegals, financial discovery, figuring out what you do and don't have and an update on case management deadline changes. Remote connections for audio or video will not be available. Registration is $35 for Division members, $50 for non-member paralegals, $55 for attorneys. For more information and registration instructions, visit www.nmbar.org > About us > Divisions > Paralegal Division > CLE Programs (click on "See Flyer" at the bottom of the page) or contact Carolyn Winton, 505-858-4433 or Linda Murphy, 505-884-0777.

Prosecutors Section

Annual Award Open

The Prosecutors Section recognizes prosecutorial excellence through its annual awards. Awards for 2016 will be presented in the following categories: child abuse (Homer Campbell Award), DWI, drugs, white collar, domestic violence, violent crimes (excluding domestic violence and child abuse cases) and children's court prosecutor. For detailed award criteria and nomination procedures, visit www.nmbar.org/prosecutors. Nominations may be made by anyone and additional letters of support are welcome. Submit nominations to Breanna Henley at bhenley@nmbar.org by Oct. 14.

UNM

Law Library

Hours Through Dec. 18

Building & Circulation	
Monday–Thursday	8 a.m.–8 p.m.
Friday	8 a.m.–6 p.m.
Saturday	10a.m.–6p.m.
Sunday	noon–6 p.m.
Reference	
Monday–Friday	9 a.m.–6 p.m.
Saturday–Sunday	Closed
Holiday Closures	
Nov. 24–25 (Thanksgiving)	

Student Animal Legal Defense Fund

Doggie Wash Fundraiser

Student Animal Legal Defense Fund is hosting a Doggie Wash and members and friends are invited to bring their dog to Long Leash on Life, located at 9800 Montgomery Blvd. NE (at Eubank), Sept. 24, 10:30 a.m.-2:30 p.m. Dog washes are name-your-price and all proceeds benefit SALDF whose mission is to provide a forum for education, advocacy and scholarship aimed at protecting the lives and advancing the interests of animals through the legal system and to raise the profile of the field of animal law.

Other Bars

First Judicial District Bar Association

September Buffet Luncheon

Join the First Judicial District Bar Association for its next buffet luncheon from noon–1 p.m., Sept. 26, at the Hilton Hotel, 100 Sandoval Street, Santa Fe. Kyle Harwood, partner at Egolf + Ferlic + Harwood, will give a Santa Fe land and water update, including a discussion of the Aamodt case and the impact of recent amendments to the county code. Attendance is $15 and includes a buffet lunch. R.S.V.P. by 5 p.m., Sept. 22, to erin.mcsherry@state.nm.us. Payment should be made upon arrival at the event with cash, card or check to the "First Judicial District Bar Association" or "FJDBA".

New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers Association

'Lawyers, Guns and Money' CLE

Warren Zevon's classic rock song comes to life, for your educational benefit, in one information-filled CLE. Join the New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers Association in Roswell this fall for the "Lawyers, Guns & Money" (6.0 G, 1.0 EP) seminar on Oct. 14. Learn the ins and outs of touch DNA and guns, challenging ballistics, gun trusts and more. Civil attorneys welcome. To register for this seminar, visit www.nmcdla.org.

New Mexico Defense Lawyers

Annual Awards Luncheon

The New Mexico Defense Lawyers Association will honor two attorneys at its Annual Awards Luncheon and CLE event on Oct. 14 at the Hotel Andaluz in Albuquerque. The 2016 Defense Lawyer of the Year Award will be presented to Lee M. Rogers, Jr. of Atwood Malone Turner & Sabin, PA, and the 2016 Young Lawyer of the Year Award will be presented to Corinne L. Holt of Allen Shepherd Lewis & Syra, PA. The luncheon celebration will be followed by a CLE program featuring nationally recognized speaker and attorney Christopher W. Martin of Martin, Disiere, Jefferson & Wisdom, LLP, on the topic "Jury Selection in the 21st Century: Millennials, Misfits and More." A panel of distinguished judges will then discuss ethics and professionalism topics relevant to jury selection and civil defense practice. The event will conclude with a reception. For more information and registration, visit www.nmdla.org or call 505-797-6021.

Other News

Center for Civic Values

Gene Franchini High School Mock Trial Competition Needs Judges

The Gene Franchini High School Mock Trial Competition needs judges. Registration is now open for judges and administration volunteers for the qualifier competition (Feb. 17–18, 2017) and state competition (March 17–18, 2017). Mock trial is an innovative, hands-on experience in the law for high school students of all ages and abilities. Every year hundreds of New Mexico teenagers and their teacher advisors and attorney coaches spend the better part of the school year researching, studying and preparing a hypothetical courtroom trial involving issues that are important and interesting to young people. Sign up at www.civicvalues.org. For more information, contact Kristen Leeds at the Center for Civic Values at 505-764-9417 or kristen@civicvalues.org.

Santa Fe Neighborhood Law Center

Law and Policy for Neighborhoods CLE

Join the Santa Fe Neighborhood Law Center for it's annual CLE "Law and Policy for Neighborhoods" (10.0 G, 2.0 EP), Dec. 8–9 at the Santa Fe Convention Center. Featured speakers include Chief Justice Charles W. Daniels and recently retired Justice Richard C. Bosson. A discounted rate for early registration is available through Nov. 25. A free continental breakfast and box lunch will be provided both days on site for CLE attendees and faculty. For more information or to register, visit www.sfnlc.com/.

2016 Annual Meeting—Bench & Bar Conference

Keynote Address with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg

As keynote speaker of the 2016 Annual Meeting-Bench & Bar Conference, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg drew a crowd of almost 1,000 at the Buffalo Thunder Resort in Santa Fe on Aug. 19. President J. Brent Moore said this was the largest gathering of the New Mexico legal community in history.

The Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S. began the session with a tribute to the late Justice Antonin Scalia who passed away in February, saying "Justice Scalia's death was the most momentous occurrence of the… 2015–2016 term, and his absence will be felt for many terms ahead." Though they often represented opposite sides of the political spectrum, the justices were close personal friends and respected colleagues. Justice Ginsburg recalled the many times the two were questioned about their friendship and quoted Justice Scalia saying, "I attack ideas, I don't attack people. Some very good people have some very bad ideas." Justice Ginsburg recalled the robust debates the two had while writing opinions as well as many memories from time spent together off the bench. "I miss the challenges and the laughter Justice Scalia provoked, his pungent, eminently quotable opinions…, the roses he brought me on my birthday, the chance to appear with him once more as supernumeraries at the Washington National Opera," said Justice Ginsburg, indicating that the Court is a paler place without him.

The keynote address was set up like a fireside chat. Roberta Cooper Ramo, the first female president of the ABA and prominent Albuquerque attorney, led Justice Ginsburg in a discussion of Supreme Court procedure, current legal issues and some history of the women's rights movements. Ramo asked about interpreting the notable ambiguity of some provisions in the Constitution of the U.S. Justice Ginsburg referred to the first line of the document, "We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union…" and said, in her view, "we are still perfecting that Union." When Ramo turned the discussion to that of the formation of a majority and the assignment of opinions, Justice Ginsburg reminded the audience that the members of the Court agree on more than they disagree. Mentioning the current vacancy on the Court, she said "when we are evenly divided, it is equivalent to denying review in the first place."

Finally, Ramo asked Justice Ginsburg if she had any parting advice for lawyers building their careers. Justice Ginsburg recalled her time in college during the days of Sen. Joe McCarthy. Her constitutional law professor pointed out that although the nation seemed strained from its most basic values, there were lawyers trying to help. "I thought that was pretty nifty," said Justice Ginsburg, "you could be a lawyer and earn a living… but you could also do something to make conditions in your society a little better." Stressing that an important part of being a lawyer is giving back, Justice Ginsburg said that this "should be every lawyer's obligation."

The audience hung on to every word, giving Justice Ginsburg a standing ovation at the end. President Moore presented the Justice with a wrap made by a local artist to wear at the Santa Fe Opera during her annual trips to New Mexico.

For more coverage of the Annual Meeting and a full video of Justice Ginsburg's keynote address, visit www.nmbar.org/AnnualMeeting.

Opening Remarks



State Bar President J. Brent Moore and Chief Justice Charles W. Daniels opened the 2016 Annual Meeting and welcomed attendees. Moore presented thank you gifts to the sponsors and called this year's annual meeting a very special one. Chief Justice Daniels recalled his first Annual Meeting and reflected on the changes to the State Bar he's witnessed. Saying, "You could've put the entire bar in this room," it's clear the State Bar has come a long way since the Chief Justice's first Annual Meeting in 1969!

CLE Programming

Plenary: Gender and Justice: New Mexico Women in Robes

Judge Sarah Singleton moderated a panel discussion of issues facing women in the legal community and on the bench. Pictured from left to right, Judge Singleton, Chief Judge Christina Armijo, Justice Judith K. Nakamura, Justice Petra Jimenez Maes and Justice Barbara J. Vigil discussed these issues and their own experiences. The high court in New Mexico enjoys its first female majority in history. It is one of the few states in the nation with this kind of majority.

Plenary: Bail Reform in New Mexico

The possibility of bail reform is one of the most important issues facing the New Mexico legal community. Pictured from left to right, Chief Justice Charles W. Daniels, Professor Leo M. Romero and Chief Judge of the Second Judicial District Court Nan G. Nash discussed pros and cons of proposed bail reform rules and the constitutional amendment on the ballot in November.

Plenary: Journalism, Law and Ethics

Former ABC Whitehouse Correspondent Sam Donaldson (center) shared some of his experiences as a national news correspondent during Friday's afternoon plenary "Journalism, Law and Ethics." Albuquerque attorneys Scott D. Gordon (left) and John Samore (right) commented on the legal, ethical and professional issues implicated in Donaldson's stories.

President's Reception

Hector Pimentel

Prominent guitarist Hector Pimentel entertained the crowd at the Aug. 19 President's Reception with classic New Mexican music.

Glitz in a Glass

Almost 50 attendees waited patiently in line for their turn to pick a glass of champagne during the Glitz in a Glass feature at the reception. Beauchamp Jewelers provided a half-carat diamond which was dropped in a glass of champagne and disguised amongst others with cubic zirconia. Trish Rose (pictured above) was the lucky winner.

Eager participants inspect the glasses in hopes of winning

Ex Parte Party

The Young Lawyers Division and the New Mexico Statewide Alumni Chapter of Phi Alpha Delta hosted an after party with a hosted bar, DJ and Dance-off Contest. Attendees danced the night away after a productive day of CLE and networking.



YLD member Robert Lara DJ'd the event



YLD Chair Spencer Edelman and board members Sean FitzPatrick, Erin Atkins, Tomas Garcia and Sonia Russo

Look for more special coverage of the Annual Meeting!
Sept. 28: Annual Meeting Golf Tournament, Opening Reception, Saturday programming and more

Board of Bar Commissioners Election Notice 2016

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 24-101, the Board of Bar Commissioners is the elected governing board of the State Bar of New Mexico. Candidates must consider that voting members of the Board of Bar Commissioners are required to do the following:

Duties and Requirements for Board of Bar Commissioner Members:

- Attend all Board meetings (up to six per year), including the Annual Meeting of the State Bar.
- Represent the State Bar at local bar-related meetings and events.
- Communicate regularly with constituents regarding State Bar activities.
- Promote the programs and activities of the State Bar.
- Participate on Board and Supreme Court committees.
- Evaluate the State Bar's programs and operations on a regular basis.
- Ensure financial accountability for the organization.
- Support and participate in State Bar referral programs.
- Establish and enforce bylaws and policies.

Notice is hereby given that the 2016 election of eight commissioners for the State Bar of New Mexico will close at noon, Dec. 1. Nominations to the office of bar commissioner shall be made by the written petition of any 10 or more members of the State Bar who are in good standing and whose principal place of practice is in the respective district. Members of the State Bar may nominate and sign for more than one candidate. (See the nomination petition on the next page.)

The following terms will expire Dec. 31, 2016, and need to be filled in the upcoming election. All of the positions are three-year terms, except as noted, and run from Jan. 1, 2017–Dec. 31, 2019.

First Bar Commissioner District

Bernalillo County
Two positions currently held by:
- Joshua A. Allison
- Mary Martha Chicoski*

Third Bar Commissioner District

Los Alamos, Rio Arriba, Sandoval and Santa Fe counties
Two positions currently held by:
- Carla C. Martinez**
- Carolyn A. Wolf

Fourth Bar Commissioner District

Colfax, Guadalupe, Harding, Mora, San Miguel, Taos and Union counties
One position currently held by:
- Ernestina R. Cruz

Sixth Bar Commissioner District

Chaves, Eddy, Lee, Lincoln and Otero counties
One position currently held by:
- Erinna M. Atkins (one-year term)

Seventh Bar Commissioner District

Catron, Dona Ana, Grant, Hidalgo, Luna, Sierra, Socorro and Torrance counties
Two positions currently held by:
- Roxanna M. Chacon
- Frank N. Chavez

*Ineligible to seek re-election
**Not seeking re-election

Send nomination petitions to:
Executive Director Joe Conte
State Bar of New Mexico
PO Box 92860
Albuquerque, NM 87199-2860
jconte@nmbar.org

Petitions must be received by 5 p.m., Oct. 24

Direct inquiries to 505-797-6099 or jconte@nmbar.org.

Nomination Petition for Board of Bar Commissioners

We, the undersigned, members in good standing of the State Bar of New Mexico, nominate _____, whose principal place of practice is in the _____Bar Commissioner District, State of New Mexico, for the position of commissioner of the State Bar of New Mexico representing the _____Bar Commissioner District.

Submitted_____, 2016

(1) _____ _____
Signature

_____ _____
Type or Print Name *Address*

(2) _____ _____
Signature

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(3) _____ _____
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CELEBRATE PRO BONO

www.celebrateprobono.org

OCTOBER 2016: The American Bar Association has dedicated an entire week in October to the **"National Celebration of Pro Bono."** In New Mexico, the local Judicial District Court Pro Bono Committees have extended this celebration to span the entire month of October (and part of September). The committees are hosting a number of pro bono events across the state, including free legal fairs, clinics, recognition luncheons, Continuing Legal Education classes and more!

1st JUDICIAL DISTRICT:

Pro Bono Appreciation Luncheon and CLE
October 17, 2016 from 11:30 AM – 2:30 PM
Hilton of Santa Fe
(100 Sandoval St., Santa Fe, NM 87501)
CLE and luncheon details TBA

Free Legal Fair
October 22, 2016 from 10 AM – 1 PM
Mary Esther Gonzales Senior Center
(1121 Alto St., Santa Fe, NM 87501)

2nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT:

Law-La-Palooza Free Legal Fair
October 20, 2016 from 3 – 6 PM
Alamosa Community Center
(6900 Gonzales Rd. SW #C, Albuquerque, NM 87121)

4th JUDICIAL DISTRICT:

Free Legal Fair and Pro Bono Appreciation Luncheon
October 18, 2016 from 9 AM – 2 PM
Location TBA

5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT (CHAVES):

Free Legal Fair
October 7, 2016 from 1:30 PM – 4:30 PM
Roswell Adult and Senior Center
(807 N. Missouri Ave., Roswell, NM 88201)

5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT (LEA):

Free Legal Fair
October 14, 2016 from 1 PM – 3 PM
Hobbs City Hall
(200 E. Broadway, Hobbs, NM 88240)

6th JUDICIAL DISTRICT (LUNA):

Free Legal Fair
October 28, 2016 from 10 AM – 1 PM
Luna County District Court
(855 S. Platinum, Deming, NM 88030)

9th JUDICIAL DISTRICT:

Pro Bono Appreciation Bench and Bar Mixer
October 21, 2016 from 3 PM – 6 PM
K-BOB's Steakhouse
(1600 Mabry Dr., Clovis, NM 88101)

12th JUDICIAL DISTRICT (LINCOLN):

Free Legal Fair
October 29, 2016 from 10 AM – 2 PM
Location TBA

12th JUDICIAL DISTRICT (OTERO):

Free Legal Fair
September 24, 2016 from 10 AM - 2 PM
Otero County Courthouse
(1000 New York Ave., Room 208, Alamogordo, NM 88310)

To learn more about any of the events below, or to get involved with your local pro bono committee, please contact Aja Brooks at ajab@nmlegalaid.org or (505)814-5033.
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STATE BAR of NEW MEXICO

Legal Education

September

22 **EEOC Update, Whistleblowers and Wages (2015 Employment and Labor Law Institute)**
3.2 G
Live Replay, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

22 **The New Lawyer – Rethinking Legal Services in the 21st Century (2015)**
4.5 G, 1.5 EP
Live Replay, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

22 **Law Practice Succession – A Little Thought Now, a Lot Less Panic Later (2015)**
2.0 EP
Live Replay, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

22 **Guardianship in NM: the Kinship Guardianship Act (2016)**
5.5 G, 1.0 EP
Live Replay, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

23 **2016 Tax Symposium**
6.0 G, 1.0 EP
Webcast/Live Seminar, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

23 **Ethics and Keeping Secrets or Telling Tales in Joint Representations**
1.0 EP
Teleseminar
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

25 **The 22nd Annual Conference of the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement**
18.0 G
Live Program, Albuquerque
National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement
http://www.nacole.org/

26–29 **Bankruptcy From a Government Perspective**
19.8 G, 1.5 EP
Live Seminar, Santa Fe
National Association of Attorneys General
www.naag.org

29 **Estate Planning for Liquidity**
1.0 G
Teleseminar
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

29 **Civility and Professionalism (Ethicspalooza Redux – Winter 2015 Edition)**
1.0 EP
Live Replay, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

29 **The US District Court: The Next Step in Appealing Disability Denials (2015)**
3.0 G, 1.0 EP
Live Replay, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

29 **Invasion of the Drones: IP-Privacy, Policies, Profits, (2015 Annual Meeting)**
1.5 G
Live Replay, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

30 **Powerful Non-Defensive Communication: Cutting Edge Tools for Collaborative Law Professionals**
6.7 G
Live Seminar, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

October

1 **New Mexico American College of Trial Lawyers Chapter Seminar**
2.0 G, 1.0 EP
Live Program
American College of Trial Lawyers
949-752-1801

1 **Practical and Ethical Aspects of Law & Technology—The Medical Expense Battle: Admissibility of Amounts Billed vs. Amounts Paid**
2.0 G, 1.0 EP
Live Seminar, Santa Fe
American College of Trial Lawyers
mark@klecanlawnm.com

3 **Mastering Microsoft Word in the Law Office**
6.2 G
Webcast/Live Seminar, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

4 **Indemnification Provisions in Contracts**
1.0 G
Teleseminar
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

5 **Attorneys Information Exchange Group 2016 Fall Conference**
14.0 G
Live Seminar, Santa Fe
Attorneys Information Exchange Group
www.aieg.com

5 **New Mexico Film Industry and Film Tax Credit**
1.0 G, 0.5 CPE
Live Seminar, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

Listings in the Bar Bulletin *CLE Calendar are derived from course provider submissions. All MCLE approved continuing legal education courses can be listed free of charge. Send submissions to notices@nmbar.org. Include course title, credits, location, course provider and registration instructions.*

October

1 **Wildlife/Endangered Species on Public and Private Lands**
6.0 G
Live Replay, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

5 **Managing Employee Leave**
1.0 G
Teleseminar
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

5 **Ahead of the Curve: Risk Management for Lawyers**
3.0 G
Live Seminar, Albuquerque
CNA/Health Agencies
www.healthagencies.com/lawyers/cna-seminars/

6 **Ahead of the Curve: Risk Management for Lawyers**
3.0 G
Live Seminar, Santa Fe
CNA/Health Agencies
www.healthagencies.com/lawyers/cna-seminars/

6 **2016 New Mexico Health Law Symposium**
5.9 G, 1.0 EP
Webcast/Live Seminar, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

7 **Employment and Labor Law Institute**
6.5 G
Webcast/Live Seminar, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

10–14 **Basic Practical Regulatory Training for the Natural Gas Local Distribution Industry**
24.5 G
Live Seminar, Albuquerque
Center for Public Utilities New Mexico State University
business.nmsu.edu

10–14 **Basic Practical Regulatory Training for the Electric Industry**
26.2 G
Live Seminar, Albuquerque
Center for Public Utilities New Mexico State University
business.nmsu.edu

13 **Joint Ventures Between For-Profits and Non-Profits**
1.0 G
Teleseminar
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

13–14 **34th Annual Advanced Oil, Gas & Energy Resources Law**
10.3 G, 1.7 EP
Video Replay, Santa Fe
State Bar of Texas
www.texasbarcle.com

14 **Citizenfour—The Edward Snowden Story**
3.2 G
Live Seminar
Federal Bar Association, New Mexico Chapter
505-268-3999

14 **Lawyers, Guns & Money**
6.0 G, 1.0 EP
Live Seminar, Roswell
New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers Association
www.nmcdla.org

14–15 **2016 New Mexico Family Law Institute**
10.0 G, 2.0 EP
Webcast/Live Seminar, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

21 **2016 Administrative Law Institute**
4.0 G, 2.0 EP
Webcast/Live Seminar, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

21 **Ethics and Cloud Computing**
1.0 EP
Teleseminar
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

21 **Annual Criminal Law Seminar**
10.0 G, 2.0 EP
Live Seminar
El Paso Criminal Law Group Inc.
915-534-6005

25 **Fiduciary Standards in Business Transactions: Good Faith and Fair Dealing**
1.0 G
Teleseminar
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

27 **Spring Elder Law Institute (2016)**
6.2 G
Live Replay, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

27 **More Reasons to be Skeptical of Expert Witnesses (2015)**
5.0 G, 1.5 EP
Live Replay, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

27 **2015 Federal Practice Tips and Advice From U.S. Magistrate Judges**
2.0 G, 1.0 EP
Live Replay, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

27 **Everything Old is New Again – How the Disciplinary Board Works (Ethicspalooza Redux—Winter 2015 Edition)**
1.0 EP
Live Replay, Albuquerque
Center for Legal Education of NMSBF
www.nmbar.org

Opinions

As Updated by the Clerk of the New Mexico Court of Appeals

Mark Reynolds, Chief Clerk New Mexico Court of Appeals
PO Box 2008 • Santa Fe, NM 87504-2008 • 505-827-4925

Effective September 9, 2016

Published Opinions

No. 33807	2nd Jud Dist Bernalillo CR-11-5825, STATE v K PITNER (affirm)	9/8/2016
No. 34285	AD AD AQCB-14-2, AIR QUALITY PERMIT NO 3135 (vacate and remand)	9/9/2016

Unpublished Opinions

No. 33608	2nd Jud Dist Bernalillo CR-12-872, STATE v G JOHNSON JR (affirm in part, reverse in part and remand)	9/6/2016
No. 35106	3rd Jud Dist Dona Ana CR-13-1165, STATE v A SWEAT (affirm)	9/6/2016
No. 34386	2nd Jud Dist Bernalillo JR-14-568, STATE v RAMON O (reverse and remand)	9/6/2016
No. 35439	2nd Jud Dist Bernalillo CR-13-4004, STATE v J NIETO (affirm)	9/7/2016
No. 35544	2nd Jud Dist Bernalillo CR-07-922, STATE v J BENAVIDEZ (affirm)	9/7/2016
No. 35103	WCA-05-59990, K MACAISLIN v NOAH's ARK (reverse and remand)	9/8/2016
No. 35404	11th Jud Dist San Juan CV-14-492, B DILS v R JENSEN (reverse)	9/8/2016
No. 35467	12th Jud Dist Otero CR-14-258, STATE v M LEDESMA (affirm)	9/8/2016

Slip Opinions for Published Opinions may be read on the Court's website:
http://coa.nmcourts.gov/documents/index.htm

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From the Clerk of the New Mexico Supreme Court

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Dated Sept. 2, 2016

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Recent Rule-Making Activity

As Updated by the Clerk of the New Mexico Supreme Court

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PO Box 848 • Santa Fe, NM 87504-0848 • (505) 827-4860

Effective September 21, 2016

Pending Proposed Rule Changes Open for Comment:

Rule 10-315	Custody hearing	10/03/16
Rule 10-318	Placement of Indian children	10/03/16
Form 10-521	ICWA notice	10/03/16

Recently Approved Rule Changes Since Release of 2016 NMRA:

		Effective Date
Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts		
Rule 1-079	Public inspection and sealing of court records	05/18/16
Rule 1-131	Notice of federal restriction on right to possess or receive a firearm or ammunition	05/18/16
Civil Forms		
Form 4-940	Notice of federal restriction on right to possess or receive a firearm or ammunition	05/18/16
Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts		
Rule 5-123	Public inspection and sealing of court records	05/18/16
Rule 5-615	Notice of federal restriction on right to receive or possess a firearm or ammunition	05/18/16
Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Magistrate Courts		
Rule 6-506	Time of commencement of trial	05/24/16
Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Metropolitan Courts		
Rule 7-506	Time of commencement of trial	05/24/16
Rules of Procedure for the Municipal Courts		
Rule 8-506	Time of commencement of trial	05/24/16
Criminal Forms		
Form 9-515	Notice of federal restriction on right to possess or receive a firearm or ammunition	05/18/16
Children's Court Rules and Forms		
Rule 10-166	Public inspection and sealing of court records	05/18/16
Rule 10-171	Notice of federal restriction on right to receive or possess a firearm or ammunition	05/18/16
Form 10-604	Notice of federal restriction on right to possess or receive a firearm or ammunition	05/18/16
Second Judicial District Court Local Rules		
LR2-400	Case management pilot program for criminal cases	02/02/16

To view all pending proposed rule changes (comment period open or closed), visit the New Mexico Supreme Court's website at http://nmsupremecourt.nmcourts.gov. To view recently approved rule changes, visit the New Mexico Compilation Commission's website at http://www.nmcompcomm.us.

Notice of Publication for Comment

Proposed Amendments to the Children's Court Rules and Forms Used in Abuse and Neglect Proceedings Subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act

The Children's Court Rules Committee is considering whether to recommend for the Supreme Court's consideration emergency, out-of-cycle approval of proposed amendments to the Children's Court Rules and Forms. If approved, the amendments would coincide with the effective date of recently approved amendments to the federal regulations that implement the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 to 1963. See Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,778 (June 14, 2016) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23).

The amended federal regulations, which will become effective on December 12, 2016, are intended to "clarify the minimum Federal standards governing implementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to ensure that ICWA is applied in all States consistent with the Act's express language, Congress's intent in enacting the statute, and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families." Id. at 38,778, 38,868. To that end, the regulations promote the early identification of Indian children in state child custody proceedings, and seek to minimize the unnecessary separation of Indian children from their families and to maximize early compliance with the child placement preferences set forth in ICWA. See Bureau of Indian Affairs, Frequently Asked Questions, Final Rule: Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) Proceedings, at 3-4 (June 17, 2016), http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/xraca/documents/text/idc1 034295.pdf.

The proposed amendments to the Children's Court Rules and Forms are intended to raise awareness of key requirements of the new federal regulations and to incorporate those requirements into proceedings under the Abuse and Neglect Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-4-1 to -34. For example, proposed amended Rule 10-315 NMRA would require the court to inquire at the custody hearing whether any party or participant "knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child." Accord 81 Fed. Reg. at 38,869-70 (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 23.107). Proposed new Rule 10-318 NMRA would further require the court to ensure that the department follows ICWA's placement preferences when there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child. Accord 81 Fed. Reg. at 38,874-75 (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.129 to .132). And proposed amended Form 10-521 NMRA would incorporate the amended requirements for providing notice of a child-custody proceeding to an Indian child's parent, Indian custodian, or tribe. Accord 81 Fed. Reg. at 38,870-71 (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 23.111).

If you would like to comment on the proposed new and amended rules and form set forth below before the committee submits its final recommendation to the Supreme Court, you may do so by either submitting a comment electronically through the Supreme Court's web site at http://nmsupremecourt.nmcourts.gov/ or sending your written comments by mail, email or fax to:

Joey D. Moya, Clerk
New Mexico Supreme Court
P.O. Box 848
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87504 0848
nmsupremecourtclerk@nmcourts.gov
505 827 4837 (fax)

Comments must be received by the Clerk on or before Oct. 3, 2016, to be considered by the committee. Note that any submitted comments may be posted on the Supreme Court's website for public viewing.

10315. Custody hearing.

A. **Time limits.** A custody hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from the date a petition is filed alleging abuse or neglect. At the custody hearing the court shall determine if the child should remain or be placed in the custody of the department pending adjudication. Upon written request of the respondent, the hearing may be held sooner, but in no event shall the hearing be held less than two (2) days after the date the petition was filed.

B. **Notice.** The department shall give reasonable notice of the time and place of the custody hearing to the parents, guardian, or custodian of the child alleged to be abused or neglected.

C. **Audio recording.** The court shall make an audio recording of the custody hearing and shall provide a copy of the recording immediately upon request to a party who wishes to file an appeal under Paragraph [E]I of this rule.

D. **ICWA; Indian child; duty to inquire.** At the commencement of the custody hearing, the court shall ask each party and participant, including the guardian *ad litem* and agency representative, to state on the record under oath whether the party or participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act. An Indian child is any unmarried person who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time the petition is filed and who is either,

(1) a member of an Indian Tribe; or

(2) eligible for membership in an Indian Tribe and the biological child of a member of an Indian Tribe.

E. **ICWA; duty to determine; reason to know.** On the basis of the information and evidence provided, the court shall determine that the child is or is not an Indian child. If the evidence is insufficient to make such a determination, the court shall determine whether there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child. The court has reason to know that the child is an Indian child upon the occurrence of any of the following:

(1) any participant in the proceeding, officer of the court involved in the proceeding, Indian Tribe, Indian organization, or agency informs the court that the child is an Indian child;

(2) any participant in the proceeding, officer of the court involved in the proceeding, Indian Tribe, Indian organization, or agency informs the court that it has discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian child;

(3) the child who is the subject of the proceeding gives the court reason to know he or she is an Indian child;

(4) the court is informed that the domicile or residence of the child, the child's parent, or the child's Indian custodian is on a pueblo, reservation, or in an Alaska Native village;

(5) the court is informed that the child is or has been a ward of a Tribal court; or

(6) the court is informed that either parent or the child possesses an identification card indicating membership in an Indian Tribe.

F. **Indian child; effect on proceedings.** If the court determines that the child is an Indian child, or determines that there is reason to know the child is an Indian child but insufficient evidence to determine that the child is or is not an Indian child, the court shall do the following:

(1) confirm, by way of a report, declaration, or testimony included in the record that the department or other party used due diligence to identify and work with all Tribes of which there is reason to know the child may be a member (or eligible for membership), to verify whether the child is in fact a member (or a biological parent is a member and the child is eligible for membership);

(2) ensure that the department promptly sends notice of the proceeding as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act and its regulations and substantially in the form approved by the Supreme Court; and

(3) treat the child as an Indian child subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act unless and until it is determined on the record that the child does not meet the definition of an Indian child under applicable law. Treating the child as an Indian child includes, but is not limited to, the following:

(a) permitting the temporary or emergency foster care placement to continue only if the court finds that it is necessary to prevent imminent physical harm to the child; and

(b) terminating the temporary or emergency foster care placement as soon as the court or agency possesses sufficient evidence to determine that the emergency removal is no longer necessary to prevent imminent physical harm to the child, unless the court orders a foster care placement in accordance with the standard of proof and time limits mandated by the Indian Child Welfare Act and its regulations.

G. **Not an Indian child; effect on proceedings; continuing duty to disclose.** If the court determines that the child is not an Indian child, or that there is no reason to know that the child is an Indian child, the court shall do the following:

(1) proceed as though the child is not subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act; and

(2) order the parties and participants at the hearing to inform the court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know that the child is an Indian child. If the court finds, on the basis of information or evidence presented at a later hearing, that there is reason to know the child is an Indian child, the court shall proceed as required under Paragraph E of this rule.

[~~D~~]H. **Form of order.** The decision of the court shall be made by a written order that shall be filed with the clerk of the court at the earliest practicable time.

[~~E~~]I. **Appeal.** An order filed under this rule that grants legal custody of a child to, or withholds legal custody from, one or more parties may be appealed as provided by Section 32A418 NMSA 1978. An appeal from such an order shall proceed as an expedited appeal under Rule 12206A NMRA of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

[As amended, effective August 1, 1999; Rule 10303 NMRA, recompiled and amended as Rule 10315 NMRA by Supreme Court Order No. 088300042, effective January 15, 2009; as amended by Supreme Court Order No.148300004, effective in all cases filed on or after July 1, 2014; as amended by Supreme Court Order No. _____, effective _____.]

Committee commentary. — See Section 32A418 NMSA 1978 (2005), which provides criteria for the issuance of custody orders. The Rules of Evidence, other than those with respect to privileges, do not apply to custody hearings. See Rule 111101 NMRA of the Rules of Evidence.

The 2016 amendments to the rule coincide with the adoption of new regulations by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) that are intended to "clarify the minimum Federal standards governing implementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to ensure that ICWA is applied in all States consistent with the Act's express language, Congress's intent in enacting the statute, and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families." 25 C.F.R. § 23.101. Consistent with the new regulations, the amended rule places an affirmative duty on the court to ask each participant at the commencement of every custody hearing whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child. *See* 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (providing that the court shall make such an inquiry at the commencement of an "emergency or voluntary or involuntary childcustody proceeding").

The amended rule further requires the court to determine, based on the information provided by the participants, whether the child is in fact an Indian child or, at a minimum, whether there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child. If either condition is met, the rule requires the court to treat the child as an Indian child subject to ICWA and to ensure that the department has complied and continues to comply with its responsibilities under ICWA. *See* 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(b) (requiring the court to confirm that the department has used "due diligence to identify and work with all of the Tribes of which there is reason to know that the child may be a member (or eligible for membership), to verify whether the child is in fact a member (or a biological parent is a member and the child is eligible for membership)"); *id.* § 23.111 (setting forth the notice and timing requirements for childcustody proceedings that involve an Indian child); *see also* Form 10521 NMRA (ICWA notice).

The law is unsettled about whether ICWA's notice and timing requirements apply at the custody hearing. *See* 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (providing that no proceeding shall be held until at least 10 days after receipt of notice by the parent, Indian custodian, and Tribe and requiring the court to grant up to an additional 20 days to prepare for the hearing upon request of the child's parent, Indian custodian, or tribe). The Supreme Court has held that ex parte and custody hearings are emergency proceedings under ICWA and therefore are exempt from the requirements of § 1912. *See State ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Dep't v. Marlene C.*, 2011NMSC005, 34, 149 N.M. 315, 248 P.3d 863 ("New Mexico's ex parte and custody hearings are emergency proceedings under [25 U.S.C.] § 1922 to which the requirements of [25 U.S.C.] § 1912 do not apply.").

Recently adopted federal regulations, however, clarify the standards imposed in emergency proceedings under ICWA and are difficult to reconcile with the procedures allowed under New Mexico law. *Compare, e.g.*, 25 C.F.R. § 23.113(b) (providing that the emergency removal or placement of an Indian child must be based on a finding that the removal or placement "is necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child"), *and*

id. § 23.113(e) (providing that an emergency proceeding should not be continued for more than 30 days without a finding, *inter alia*, that "restoring the child to the parent or Indian custodian would subject the child to imminent physical damage or harm"), *with* NMSA 1978, § 32A418(C) (providing that custody may be awarded to the department based upon a showing that, *inter alia*, "the child will be subject to injury by others if not placed in the custody of the department"), *and id.* § 32A419(A) (providing that an adjudicatory hearing shall commence within 60 days of service on the respondent).

Regardless of the continued validity of *Marlene C.*, the committee views the new regulations, taken as a whole, as a directive to engage potentially interested Tribes as early as possible in a childcustody proceeding in which an Indian child may be affected. *See* 25 C.F.R. § 23.101. Thus, the committee recommends as a best practice that the department, at a minimum, should inform the Tribe of the custody hearing when the department knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child prior to the custody hearing.

If the court determines at the custody hearing that the child is not an Indian child and that there is no reason to know that the child is an Indian child, the amended rule requires the court to order the participants to inform the court of any information that they subsequently receive that provides reason to know that the child is an Indian child. Although not required by rule or regulation, the committee encourages courts to inquire at each proceeding following the custody hearing whether any participant has received such information.

[As amended by Supreme Court Order No. 088300042, effective January 15, 2009; as amended by Supreme Court Order No. _____, effective _____.]

[NEW MATERIAL]

10-318. Placement of Indian children.

A. **Placement preferences.** The court shall ensure that the department follows the placement preferences established by the Indian Child Welfare Act and its regulations when the following conditions are met:

(1) the court finds at the custody hearing or any subsequent hearing that there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child; and

(2) legal custody of the child is or has been transferred or awarded to the department.

B. **Applicability.** The placement preferences must be applied in any foster care, preadoptive, or adoptive placement by the department unless there is a determination on the record that good cause exists to not apply those placement preferences.

C. **Departure from placement preferences; good cause.** If any party asserts that good cause exists not to follow the placement preferences, the reasons for that belief or assertion must be stated orally on the record or provided in writing to the parties to the proceeding and the court. The party seeking departure from the placement preferences bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that there is good cause to depart from the placement preferences.

D. **Determination of good cause.** A determination of good cause to depart from the placement preferences must be made on the record or in writing and based on one or more of the following considerations:

(1) the request of one or both of the Indian child's parents, if they attest that they have reviewed the placement options, if any, that comply with the order of preference;

(2) the request of the child, if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to understand the decision that is being made;

(3) the presence of a sibling attachment that can be maintained only through a particular placement;

(4) the extraordinary physical, mental, or emotional needs of the child, such as specialized treatment services that may be unavailable in the community where families who meet the placement preferences live; or

(5) the unavailability of a suitable placement after a determination by the court that a diligent search was conducted to find suitable placements meeting the preference criteria, but none has been located. For purposes of this analysis, the standards for determining whether a placement is unavailable must conform to the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community in which the Indian child's parent or extended family resides or with which the Indian child's parent or extended family members maintain social and cultural ties.

E. **Good cause; impermissible considerations.**

(1) ***Socioeconomic status.*** A placement may not depart from the placement preferences based on the socioeconomic status of any placement relative to another placement.

(2) ***Ordinary bonding or attachment.*** A placement may not depart from the placement preferences based solely on ordinary bonding or attachment that flowed from time spent in a nonpreferred placement that was made in violation of ICWA.

F. **Placement hearing; motion.** The court shall hold a placement hearing within ten (10) days of the filing of a motion by a party, Tribe, or the department to determine whether good cause exists to depart from the placement preferences.

(1) ***Motion by the department.*** The department shall move for a determination of good cause when it makes or recommends a placement that it knows to be a departure from the placement preferences.

(2) ***Motion by a party or Tribe.*** A party or Tribe shall move for a determination of good cause when it appears that a placement or recommended placement departs from the placement preferences.

[Approved by Supreme Court Order No. _____, effective _____.]

Committee commentary. — The Indian Child Welfare Act and its regulations provide the following placement preferences for Indian children in foster-care or preadoptive placements:

(a) In any fostercare or preadoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, including changes in fostercare or preadoptive placements, the child must be placed in the least restrictive setting that:

(1) Most approximates a family, taking into consideration sibling attachment;

(2) Allows the Indian child's special needs (if any) to be met; and

(3) Is in reasonable proximity to the Indian child's home, extended family, or siblings.

(b) In any fostercare or preadoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, where the Indian child's Tribe has not established a different order of preference under paragraph (c) of this section, preference must be given, in descending order as listed below, to placement of the child with:

(1) A member of the Indian child's extended family;

(2) A foster home that is licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian child's Tribe;

(3) An Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized nonIndian licensing authority; or

(4) An institution for children approved by an Indian Tribe or operated by an Indian organization which has a program suitable to meet the child's needs.

(c) If the Indian child's Tribe has established by resolution a different order of preference than that specified in ICWA, the Tribe's placement preferences apply, so long as the placement is the leastrestrictive setting appropriate to the particular needs of the Indian child, as provided in paragraph (a) of this section.

(d) The court must, where appropriate, also consider the preference of the Indian child or the Indian child's parent.

25 C.F.R. § 23.131.

The Indian Child Welfare Act and its regulations provide the following placement preferences for Indian children in adoptive placements:

(a) In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, where the Indian child's Tribe has not established a different order of preference under paragraph (b) of this section, preference must be given in descending order, as listed below, to placement of the child with:

(1) A member of the Indian child's extended family;

(2) Other members of the Indian child's Tribe; or

(3) Other Indian families.

(b) If the Indian child's Tribe has established by resolution a different order of preference than that specified in ICWA, the Tribe's placement preferences apply.

(c) The court must, where appropriate, also consider the placement preference of the Indian child or Indian child's parent.

25 C.F.R. § 23.130.

The rule requires the court to ensure that the department follows the placement preferences when custody has been "transferred or awarded" to the department. The use of both terms is consistent with the Children's Code and is intended to clarify that the placement preferences must be followed irrespective of when the department receives custody of the child. *See* NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-18(D)(2) (providing that the court may "award" custody of the child to the department at the conclusion of the custody hearing); § 32A-4-22(B)(2) (providing that the court may "transfer" custody of the child to the department at the conclusion of the dispositional hearing).

[Approved by Supreme Court Order No. _____, effective _____.]

10-521. ICWA notice.

[For use with Rules 10-312 and 10-315 NMRA]

STATE OF NEW MEXICO
COUNTY OF _____
_____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN THE CHILDREN'S COURT

STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel.
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES DEPARTMENT
No. _____
In the Matter of
_____, (a) Child(ren), and Concerning,
_____, Respondent(s).

ICWA NOTICE AS TO _____
(*CHILD(REN)*)[1]

COMES NOW the New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department (CYFD) by _____, Children's Court Attorney, and gives the following notice under 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) and 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.11 and 23.111:

1. An Abuse/Neglect Petition was filed in _____ County, New Mexico, _____ Judicial District Court on _____, in the above-captioned and numbered cause.

2. _____ (*name of child(ren)*), is/are unmarried, under eighteen (18) years of age, and [~~believed to~~] may be
[ ] member(s) of the _____ tribe(s); or
[ ] eligible for membership in the _____ tribe(s) and the biological child(ren) of member(s) of the _____ tribe(s).

3. [~~The basis for the belief~~] There is reason to know that the child(ren) may be eligible for membership in the _____ tribe(s) [~~is as follows:~~] because _____
_____.

4. This proceeding may result in the termination of the parental and/or custodial rights of the [~~child(ren)'s Indian parent(s) and/or Indian custodian(s)~~] parents and/or custodian(s) of the Indian child(ren).

5. The following information about _____ (*name of child(ren)*) is known (*repeat or modify as necessary if more than one child*):

a. Full name of child _____;
   i. Birth date _____;
   ii. Birthplace _____;
b. Full name of child's biological mother (*including maiden, married, and former names or aliases*) _____;
   i. Birth date _____;
   ii. Place of birth and[~~/or~~] death (*if applicable*) _____;
   iii. Tribal enrollment number _____;
   iv. Other identifying information _____;
   v. All known current and former addresses _____;
c. Full name of child's biological father (*including married and former names or aliases*) _____;
   i. Birth date _____;
   ii. Place of birth and[~~/or~~] death (*if applicable*) _____;
   iii. Tribal enrollment number _____;
   iv. Other identifying information _____;
   v. All known current and former addresses _____;
d. (*Provide the information above, if known, for the child's* [~~*maternal and paternal grandparents, great grandparents, and Indian custodians*~~] *other direct lineal ancestors, such as grandparents*).

6. The child(ren) is/are currently in the custody of CYFD, and contact with CYFD may be made by contacting either undersigned

counsel or _____, the child(ren)'s case worker, at __ _____ (*address*) or at the following telephone number: _____.

7. The child(ren) is/are currently placed in _____ (*type of placement, e.g., non-relative foster care*).

8. The Indian child(ren)'s biological Indian parent(s), Indian custodian(s), and tribe(s) [~~shall~~] have the [~~absolute~~] right to intervene[~~, premised on the establishment of the applicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to~~] in this case.

9. If the child(ren)'s Indian parent(s) or Indian custodian(s) is/are unable to afford counsel, counsel will be appointed upon a finding of indigency.

10. The address and telephone number of the _____ Judicial District Court for _____ County, New Mexico is: _____. The cause is assigned to the Honorable _____.

11. The child(ren)'s Indian parent(s), Indian custodian(s), and tribe(s) shall have the right to petition the court for transfer of the proceeding to the [~~child's tribal~~] Tribal court[~~, provided that the subject tribal court shall have the right to decline the transfer~~] as provided by 25 U.S.C. § 1911 and 25 C.F.R. § 23.115.

12. [~~These proceedings are confidential and all information contained in this notice shall be kept confidential~~] You must keep confidential the information contained in this notice, and this notice should not be handled by anyone not needing the information to exercise rights under ICWA.

13. [~~No~~] Except for emergency proceedings, no hearing on the petition in the involuntary child custody proceeding shall be held sooner than ten (10) days from the date of receipt of this notice by the child(ren)'s Indian parent(s), Indian custodian(s), and tribe(s)[~~, or sooner than fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt of this notice by the Area Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs~~]. The child(ren)'s Indian Parent(s), Indian custodian(s), and tribe(s) have the right to be granted, upon request, up to twenty (20) additional days to prepare for the child custody proceedings.[~~1~~][2]

14. The child(ren)'s Indian parent(s), Indian custodian(s), and tribe(s) shall have the right to request up to twenty (20) additional days to prepare for a hearing on the petition.

15. Request is hereby made of the _____ tribe(s) to respond to the undersigned or to the Court if and when ICWA may be applicable to this action, and the undersigned will distribute to the parties of record and to the Court.

_____
Name of Attorney, CCA
CYFD Protective Services
Address
Telephone Number

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING[2]

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this Notice, along with a copy of the Abuse/Neglect Petition and Affidavit of _____, were sent by registered/certified mail, return receipt requested, to (*check all that apply*)

[ ] the designated [~~representatives~~] Tribal Agent [~~3~~][4] of the _____ tribe(s) at _____ (*address*);

[ ] _____ (*name of Indian parent/custodian*) at _____ (*address*);

[ ] the appropriate [~~Area~~] Regional Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs [~~4~~][5] at _____ (*address*)[;

~~[ ] the Secretary of the Department of the Interior[5] at _____ (*address*), on this ____day of _____, 20____~~].

_____
Name of Attorney, CCA

USE [~~NOTE~~] NOTES

[~~1. The time limits set forth in this paragraph do not apply to proceedings for the emergency removal or placement of a child. *See* 25 U.S.C. § 1922; *see also State ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Dep't v. Marlene C.*, 2011NMSC005, ¶ 34, 149 N.M. 315, 248 P.3d 863 ("New Mexico's ex parte and custody hearings are emergency proceedings under § 1922 to which the requirements of § 1912 do not apply.").~~]

1. This form is intended for use in the early stages of a child-custody proceeding. *See* Rule 10315 (F)(1)(c) NMRA (providing that the court shall ensure that the department provides notice under ICWA when the court determines at a custody hearing that the child is an Indian child or that there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child); *see also* Rule 10312 NMRA (providing that the department shall provide the notice required under ICWA of the filing of the petition when the child is enrolled or eligible for enrollment in an Indian tribe). This form should be modified as necessary when the duty to provide notice under ICWA arises later in the proceeding. *See* Rule 10315(G) (providing that the court shall order the participants to inform the court if they receive information after the custody hearing that provides reason to know that the child is an Indian child).

2. The law is unsettled about whether the timerelated restrictions set forth in this paragraph, which are required under ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a), apply to ex parte and custody hearings. The Supreme Court has held that ex parte and custody hearings are emergency proceedings under ICWA and therefore are exempt from the requirements of § 1912. *See State ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Dep't v. Marlene C.*, 2011NMSC005, 34, 149 N.M. 315, 248 P.3d 863 ("New Mexico's ex parte and custody hearings are emergency proceedings under [25 U.S.C.] § 1922 to which the requirements of [25 U.S.C.] § 1912 do not apply.").

Recently adopted federal regulations, however, clarify the standards imposed in emergency proceedings under ICWA and are difficult to reconcile with the procedures allowed under New Mexico law. *Compare, e.g.*, 25 C.F.R. § 23.113(b) (providing that the emergency removal or placement of an Indian child must be based on a finding that the removal or placement "is necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child"), *and id.* § 23.113(e) (providing that an emergency proceeding should not be continued for more than 30 days without a finding, *inter alia*, that "restoring the child to the parent or Indian custodian would subject the child to imminent physical damage or harm"), *with* NMSA 1978, § 32A418(C) (providing that custody may be awarded to the department based upon a showing that, *inter alia*, "the child will be subject to injury by others if not placed in the custody of the department"), *and id.* § 32A419(A) (providing

that an adjudicatory hearing shall commence within 60 days of service on the respondent).

Regardless of the continued validity of *Marlene C.*, the committee views the new regulations, taken as a whole, as a directive to engage potentially interested Tribes as early as possible in a childcustody proceeding in which an Indian child may be affected. *See* 25 C.F.R. § 23.101. The committee therefore encourages all participants in an abuse and neglect proceedingincluding the courtto work with and accommodate the needs of interested Tribes to the fullest extent possible under the circumstances.

[~~2.~~]3. ICWA and its [~~accompanying~~] regulations require this Notice to be sent via registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the individuals identified in the certificate of mailing. *See* 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.11, 23.111(c). A copy of this Notice also must be served on the parties, as required by Rule 10-104 NMRA.

[~~3.~~]4. The CCA must send a copy of this Notice to the designated [~~representative~~] Tribal Agent of the Indian child's tribe(s), who may be identified by contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs or by consulting the Bureau's annually published listing of Designated Tribal Agents for Service of Notice. The CCA may also determine the identity of the designated tribal representative(s) by contacting the tribe(s), subject to the confidentiality required by law.

[~~4.~~]5. The CCA must send a copy of this Notice to the appropriate [~~Area~~] Regional Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs identified in 25 C.F.R. § 23.11(c) when the identity or location of the child's parents, Indian custodian, or Tribe cannot be ascertained but there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child. *See* 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.11(a), 23.111(e).

[~~5. The CCA is only required to send a copy of this Notice to the Secretary of the Department of the Interior when the identity and location of the child's Indian parent(s), Indian custodian(s), or tribe(s) are known. *See* 25 C.F.R. § 23.11(a), (b).~~]

[Adopted by Supreme Court Order No. 14-8300-009, effective for all cases filed or pending on or after December 31, 2014; as amended by Supreme Court Order No. _____, effective _____.]

From the New Mexico Supreme Court

Opinion Number: 2016-NMSC-027

No. S-1-SC-35478 (filed June 30, 2016)

KATHERINE MORRIS, M.D., AROOP MANGALIK, M.D., and AJA RIGGS,
Plaintiffs-Petitioners,
v.
KARI BRANDENBURG, in her official capacity as District Attorney for Bernalillo County, New Mexico, and GARY KING, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of New Mexico,
Defendants-Respondents.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
NAN G. NASH, District Judge

LAURA SCHAUER IVES
KENNEDY, KENNEDY & IVES, LLC
Albuquerque, New Mexico

ALEXANDRA FREEDMAN SMITH
ACLU OF NEW MEXICO FOUNDATION
Albuquerque, New Mexico

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for Petitioners

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Santa Fe, New Mexico
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Senators Mark Moores,
Steven P. Neville, et al.

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New Mexico Chapter

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FLORES, SANCHEZ & DAWES, P.A.
Albuquerque, New Mexico
for Amici Curiae Archbishop John
Charles Wester of the Archdiocese
of Santa Fe, et al.

Opinion

Edward L. Chávez, Justice

{1} Since at least 1963 it has been a crime in New Mexico to deliberately aid another in the taking of his or her own life. *See* NMSA 1978, § 30-2-4 (1963). Yet a physician who withdraws life-sustaining treatment from a patient, at the patient's direction, and in compliance with the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act (UHCDA), NMSA 1978, §§ 24-7A-1 to -18 (1995, as amended through 2015), is immune from criminal liability for such actions. Section 24-7A-9(A)(1). And a physician who administers pain medication to a patient in compliance with the New Mexico Pain

Relief Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 24-2D-1 to -6 (1999, as amended through 2012), even if doing so hastens the patient's death, is also immune from criminal liability. *See* § 24-2D-3. The question in this case is whether a mentally competent, terminally ill patient has a constitutional right to have a willing physician, consistent with accepted medical practices, prescribe a safe medication that the patient may self-administer for the purpose of peacefully ending the patient's life. If we answer yes to the question, a willing physician may assist the patient and avoid criminal liability because Section 30-2-4 would be unconstitutional as applied to the physician. If we answer no to the question, the alternatives for the patient are to (1) endure the prolonged physical and psychological consequences of a terminal medical condition that the patient finds intolerable; or (2) take his or her own life, possibly by violent or dangerous means.

{2} It is not easy to define who would qualify to be a terminally ill patient, or what would be the criteria for assuring a patient is competent to make an end-of-life decision, or what medical practices are acceptable to aid a patient in dying, or what constitutes a safe medication. These concerns require robust debate in the legislative and the executive branches of government. Although the State does not have a legitimate interest in preserving a painful and debilitating life that will imminently come to an end, the State does have a legitimate interest in providing positive protections to ensure that a terminally ill patient's end-of-life decision is informed, independent, and procedurally safe. More specifically, the State has legitimate interests in (1) protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession; (2) protecting vulnerable groups—including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons—from the risk of subtle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life situations, including pressures associated with the substantial financial burden of end-of-life health care costs; and (3) protecting against voluntary or involuntary euthanasia because if physician aid in dying is a constitutional right, it must be made available to everyone, even when a duly appointed surrogate makes the decision, and even when the patient is unable to self-administer the life-ending medication. Therefore, we decline to hold that there is an absolute and fundamental constitutional right to a physician's aid in dying and conclude that Section 30-2-4 is not unconstitutional on its face or as applied to Petitioners in this case.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{3} Although her cancer is now in remission, Aja Riggs says that it would bring her "peace of mind" to have the option to end her suffering by choosing aid in dying if she eventually becomes terminally ill. Ms. Riggs was diagnosed with uterine cancer in August 2011. After a surgery several months later, doctors informed her that her cancer was more extensive than they had initially thought and was "the most aggressive kind." At that point, she began chemotherapy. The chemotherapy caused Ms. Riggs to feel "extreme fatigue," sometimes to the point where "it was too much effort to even talk." She suffered serious adverse reactions to the cancer treatments, including several trips to the emergency room for an anaphylactic reaction, severe pain in her veins, and a nearly fatal infection. Several months into chemotherapy, her doctors discovered a cancerous tumor, and Ms. Riggs immediately began additional radiation therapy. She experienced many painful side effects from this treatment, including a burning sensation on her skin, constant nausea, and fatigue.

{4} During these excruciating treatments, Ms. Riggs says that she "began to think very seriously about what a death from cancer might be like," and she was not sure whether she wanted "to go all the way to the end of a death from cancer." She was afraid that eventually she would be "lying in bed in pain, or struggling not to be in pain, or mostly unconscious with everybody that cares about me around me and all of us just waiting for me to die." She considered the possibility of a "more peaceful death," but she still did not want to discuss it with her closest family and friends or her doctor because she "didn't want to implicate anybody else in what might be a crime." As a result, she thought that the choice to end her suffering would require her to "die alone and in isolation." By contrast, Ms. Riggs believed that a good death would involve

> having the presence of the people that I care about the most, who care about me the most; being at home, not being in the hospital; not having a lot of medical interventions that interfere with my ability to communicate or function as I would like to; to not have pain to the extent that it compromises my ability to connect with people or to be present in the moment; a sense of gentleness and peace to it.

{5} According to Petitioners in this case, under certain circumstances, physician aid in dying could afford Ms. Riggs precisely the peaceful death surrounded by family members for which she hopes, rather than the agonizing, unpleasant, and lonely death that she fears. Petitioners define aid in dying as "a recognized term of art for the medical practice of providing a mentally-competent, terminally-ill patient with a prescription for medication that the patient may choose to take in order to bring about a peaceful death if the patient finds his [or her] dying process unbearable." This practice is explicitly permitted and regulated by statute in four states: Oregon, Washington, Vermont, and California. *See* Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 127.800 to .897 (1995, as amended through 2013); The Washington Death with Dignity Act, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 70.245.010 to .220 & 70.245.901 to .904 (2008); Vermont Patient Choice at the End of Life Act, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 5281 to 5293 (2013, as amended through 2015); California End of Life Option Act, Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 443 to 443.22 (2016). Therefore, there is a minor but growing trend among states to recognize physician aid in dying through legislation. Further, in 2009, the Montana Supreme Court held that a terminally ill patient's choice of physician aid in dying can be a valid consent defense to a charge of homicide brought against a physician. *Baxter v. State*, 2009 MT 449, ¶ 50, 224 P.3d 1211. No appellate court has held that there is a constitutional right to physician aid in dying.

{6} Dr. Katherine Morris, a surgical oncologist at the University of New Mexico, and Dr. Aroop Mangalik, clinical director at the UNM Cancer and Research Treatment Center, want to provide the option of aid in dying for their terminally ill patients in New Mexico. Dr. Morris previously practiced medicine in Oregon, where she provided physician aid in dying to two patients pursuant to that state's Death with Dignity Act. She testified that when these patients received a lethal prescription they "expressed a feeling of peace that they had this option, and it seemed to relieve some of their suffering that was related directly to loss of control over their own bodies." Dr. Morris detailed some of the physical ailments that these patients endured in the time immediately preceding death. One of

Dr. Morris's patients had a recurring tumor on her chest wall, parts of which would continually die and "essentially [become] rotting meat;" the smell from the tumor was right under the patient's nose, which made it difficult for her to eat. Dr. Morris recalled that another patient, "a fireman, a really strong and vital guy," had skin cancer that metastasized to his spine:

> [H]e was in so much pain and we tried everything. We tried very aggressive pain management. We tried huge doses of narcotics, muscle relaxants, sedatives. We tried an implanted spinal pain pump. The best we could do for this poor man was make him unconscious. If he was awake, he was, literally, sobbing in pain.

Dr. Morris stated that terminal illness can also be psychologically challenging for patients due to a rapid loss of control over their bodily functions and a decline in their autonomy.

{7} Dr. Morris also testified about other end-of-life options that, unlike aid in dying, are explicitly permitted by statute in New Mexico. For example, the UHCDA permits patients to provide advance directives to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment and withdraw or withhold artificial nutrition and hydration. Sections 24-7A-1(G)(3)-(4); *see* § 24-7A-2. Dr. Morris testified that sometimes doctors will remove a patient from devices that are effectively keeping that patient alive. For example, a doctor may remove a patient from a dialysis machine, which will cause the patient's kidneys to fail and the patient to die. A doctor may also remove a patient from a ventilator that assists the patient's breathing, which then causes the patient to suffocate and die. The decision to end the patient's life by withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is typically made by the patient, or through an advance directive from the patient if the patient is unconscious or incompetent, or in the absence of an advance directive, a family member or close friend must make the decision on the patient's behalf. *See* § 24-7A-2. Once the decision has been made, the medical professional then actively removes the patient from the life-sustaining device. *See* §§ 24-7A-1(A), -2.

{8} Similarly, the Pain Relief Act protects physicians who prescribe medication for purposes of pain relief under accepted standards of practice, even in situations where the patient's death may be hastened by the treatment. *See* § 24-2D-3. Accordingly, doctors may provide palliative sedation, also called "terminal sedation," a practice that can hasten the patient's death. For example, Dr. Morris stated that sometimes, when a patient is in severe pain, doctors will sedate that patient into an unconscious state, and that when people are sedated to that degree, "it suppresses their breathing and sometimes ends [a patient's] life." Similar to deciding to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, a patient, a patient through an advance directive, or a patient's family member on the patient's behalf may make the ultimate decision to submit to palliative sedation, a choice that could cause the patient to die soon thereafter.

{9} According to Petitioners, the statutory schemes that regulate aid in dying in other states, particularly Oregon, could guide the standard of care employed by physicians in New Mexico who would practice aid in dying. In support of this argument, Petitioners offered testimony from Dr. Eric Kress, who practices aid in dying in Montana, where the practice is legal but is not regulated by statute. Dr. Kress testified that he spent between thirty and forty hours studying the standard of care developed for physician aid in dying in Oregon and consulting with physicians who practiced there because those physicians have developed "a body of knowledge" and it would have been malpractice not to do so.

{10} In addition to stringent requirements regarding eligibility and informed consent, *see* Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 127.800, 127.805, 127.820, 127.825, 127.830, the Oregon statute imposes waiting periods to allow time for a patient to change his or her mind, *see id.* §§ 127.840, 127.850. The patient must request the lethal prescription at least twice orally and once in writing. *Id.* § 127.840. The two oral requests must be at least fifteen days apart, and the patient must be given an opportunity to rescind his or her decision at the time of the second oral request. *Id.* The written request must be witnessed by two people, at least one of whom is a disinterested person, which means a person who is (a) not a relative by blood or marriage to the patient, (b) not aware that he or she is entitled to recover anything from the patient's estate, (c) not an employee of the health care facility where the patient resides, and (d) not the patient's physician. *Id.* § 127.897. The doctor can prescribe a lethal dose immediately following the three requests, subject to having met the two-day waiting period that follows the patient's written request. *Id.* § 127.850. The patient will then receive a lethal dose of barbiturates, such as Seconal or Pentobarbital, which the patient must then choose to self-administer. According to Dr. Nicholas Gideonse, a family practitioner in Oregon whose patients include those in need of aid of dying, these specific drugs are used "because of the high rate of certainty—not a hundred percent but 99.9 percent certainty—that [the] result of falling asleep and never waking up will occur" within minutes. Yet Dr. Kress noted that these various safeguards can also make aid in dying unavailable for those too close to death to satisfy the statutory requirements.

{11} Although the Oregon statute explicitly exempts from criminal and civil liability any doctor who provides aid in dying "in good faith compliance with" that statute, *id.* § 127.885(1), Dr. Gideonse explained that if physicians fall short of the standard of care and provide substandard or negligent care, they can still lose their licenses to practice medicine, face suits from a patient's family, and/or face prosecution.

{12} Based on the undisputed testimony, Petitioners sought declaratory and injunctive relief to the effect that either (a) Section 30-2-4, New Mexico's criminal statute prohibiting assisted suicide, did not apply to the conduct defined by Petitioners as physician aid in dying; or (b) even if the statute did apply to physician aid in dying, such an application would be unconstitutional under various provisions of the New Mexico Constitution. The district court found that Section 30-2-4 applied to physician aid in dying, but agreed with Petitioners that any prosecution of that conduct would violate the patient's "fundamental right to choose aid in dying pursuant to the New Mexico Constitution's guarantee to protect life, liberty, and seeking and obtaining happiness, N.M. Const., art. II, § 4, and its substantive due process protections, N.M. Const., art. II, § 18." Accordingly, the district court examined the application of Section 30-2-4 to physician aid in dying under strict scrutiny and held that the State had not proved that applying the statute in this manner furthered a compelling state interest. Because it had already invalidated Section 30-2-4's application to physician aid in dying on due process grounds, the district court did not address Petitioners' claims that applying Section 30-2-4 to that conduct would be "unconstitutionally vague or violate[] the guarantee of equal protection under the New Mexico Constitution."

{13} A divided Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that Section 30-2-4 applied to physician aid in dying. *Morris v. Brandenburg*, 2015-NMCA-100, ¶¶ 1, 54, 356 P.3d 564, *cert. granted*, 2015-NMCERT-008. A majority of the Court of Appeals determined that a patient's access to aid in dying did not implicate a fundamental liberty interest under Article II, Section 4 of the New Mexico Constitution and therefore reversed the district court's conclusion that strict scrutiny should apply. *Morris*, 2015-NMCA-100, ¶¶ 1, 29-47. Judge Timothy Garcia's majority opinion concluded that physician aid in dying might qualify as an important right subject to intermediate scrutiny, and Judge Garcia would have remanded the case to the district court with instructions to determine whether an intermediate scrutiny test or a rational basis test was warranted and to apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to Petitioners' claims. *Id.* ¶¶ 49-54. Judge Miles Hanisee concurred in part, clarifying that he would hold that aid in dying is neither a fundamental nor an important right, and that there is a rational basis to justify applying Section 30-2-4 to physician aid in dying. *Morris*, 2015-NMCA-100, ¶¶ 58-70 (Hanisee, J., concurring in part). Finally, Judge Linda Vanzi filed a dissenting opinion. Based on recent trends in federal due process jurisprudence, Judge Vanzi would "hold that Article II, Section 18 affords New Mexico citizens a fundamental, or at least important, liberty right to aid in dying from a willing physician," *Morris*, 2015-NMCA-100, ¶ 104 (Vanzi, J., dissenting), and the articulated government interests, while compelling or substantial in the abstract, do not justify infringing on the right, *id.* ¶ 121 (Vanzi, J., dissenting). Thus, the divided Court of Appeals opinion did not express a majority view as to which level of scrutiny should apply. We address Petitioners' due process claims under Article II, Sections 4 and 18 of the New Mexico Constitution.

II. SECTION 30-2-4 PROHIBITS PHYSICIAN AID IN DYING

{14} We must first determine whether Section 30-2-4 applies to the practice of physician aid in dying as described by Petitioners. If the statute does not apply, then it resolves the case, and we need not address Petitioners' constitutional claims. *See Allen v. LeMaster*, 2012-NMSC-001, ¶ 28, 267 P.3d 806 ("It is an enduring principle of constitutional jurisprudence that courts will avoid deciding constitutional questions unless required to do so. We have repeatedly declined to decide constitutional questions unless necessary to the disposition of the case." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). "Our principal goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the Legislature's intent." *Griego v. Oliver*, 2014-NMSC-003, ¶ 20, 316 P.3d 865. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. *State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Maurice H.* (*In re Grace H.*), 2014-NMSC-034, ¶ 34, 335 P.3d 746.

{15} Section 30-2-4 prohibits "assisting suicide," which is defined as "deliberately aiding another in the taking of his own life." Unless it would lead to an unreasonable result, we regard a statute's definition of a term as the Legislature's intended meaning. *Sw. Land Inv., Inc. v. Hubbart*, 1993-NMSC-072, ¶ 6, 116 N.M. 742, 867 P.2d 412. Because Section 30-2-4 explicitly defines "assisting suicide," we must examine whether the conduct that Petitioners refer to as physician aid in dying fits the statutory definition. Petitioners define physician aid in dying as "the medical practice of providing a mentally-competent, terminally-ill patient with a prescription for medication that the patient may choose to take in order to bring about a peaceful death if the patient finds his [or her] dying process unbearable." As Petitioners' own witnesses admitted during trial, and as is self-evident in the very definition of aid in dying offered by Petitioners, the practice of aid in dying involves a physician deliberately prescribing a lethal dose of barbiturates with the understanding that the patient will self-administer the entire dose to end his or her life, should the patient choose to do so. In the context of Section 30-2-4, the wrongful act is "aiding," which consists of "providing the means to commit suicide," as distinct from "actively performing the act which results in death." *State v. Sexson*, 1994-NMCA-004, ¶ 15, 117 N.M. 113, 869 P.2d 301. For aid in dying, the lethal dose prescribed by a physician is intended to provide the means for a patient to end his or her own life, which is consistent with how "aiding" has been defined under Section 30-2-4. Therefore, when providing aid in dying, a doctor prescribes a lethal dose of barbiturates *for the patient's use* as a means to end his or her own life—conduct clearly encompassed by the plain language of Section 30-2-4.

{16} Petitioners raise several arguments as to why we should go beyond the plain language of Section 30-2-4 and conclude that the Legislature did not intend that the criminal prohibition on assisting suicide should apply to physician aid in dying. First, Petitioners elicited detailed expert testimony explaining that the medical and psychological professions do not consider a death from aid in dying to be a suicide[1] and that the medical profession considers the underlying cause of death brought on by aid in dying to be the terminal illness itself. According to Petitioners, Section 30-2-4 was only intended to address acts of suicide, which are distinct from aid in dying. While Petitioners' contentions regarding evolving views on suicide and its distinctions from aid in dying are compelling, our analysis is bound by the statutory language, which broadly defines suicide under Section 30-2-4 as "the taking of [one's] own life" and does not track such clinical and emotional distinctions urged by Petitioners and recognized by professionals in the fields of medicine and psychology. *See* § 30-2-4. Second, Petitioners put forth related arguments that the Legislature could not have considered aid

[1]For example, Dr. David Pollack, a licensed psychiatrist who teaches at the Center for Ethics and Healthcare at Oregon Health and Science University, opined that a death from aid in dying is not the same as a suicide. Suicide is typically brought on by a "psychiatric condition" such as depression and is characteristically an "impulsive" and "solitary act." Accordingly, the family of a suicide victim will usually experience "surprise, . . . shock and disbelief or anger, a whole set of emotional reactions . . . reflecting a lack of connection between the person who committed suicide" and those closest to that person. By contrast, aid in dying is characterized by a "deliberative process," which "almost always involves the person discussing [aid in dying] with [his or her] family and friends." According to Dr. Pollack, patients choose aid in dying "to alleviate symptoms, to spare others from the burden of watching them dwindle away or be a shell of their former self [sic] or to feel like they are in control, have some autonomy and some control over the way that they die." As a result, family members of patients who choose aid in dying and ultimately end their lives in that manner "go through this process" with the patient, and are therefore "more prepared for the person's death and more at peace in relationship to it," as compared with the family of a suicide victim.

in dying in 1963 when it passed Section 30-2-4 because that practice did not arise in New Mexico until later, and that applying Section 30-2-4 to aid in dying would be contrary to New Mexico's well-established public policy of favoring patient autonomy in end-of-life decision-making, as exemplified by New Mexico's 1995 adoption of the UHCDA. Indeed, New Mexico was the first state to adopt the UHCDA after the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved an almost identical model act in 1993. *Prot. & Advocacy Sys., Inc. v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs.*, 1999-NMCA-122, ¶ 6, 128 N.M. 73, 989 P.2d 890. However, the UHCDA explicitly "does not authorize mercy killing, *assisted suicide*, euthanasia or the provision, withholding or withdrawal of health care, to the extent prohibited by other statutes of this state." Section 24-7A-13(C) (emphasis added). Contrary to Petitioners' claims, the UHCDA not only distinguishes between "assisted suicide" and other end-of-life decision-making, but also assumes that the practice is "prohibited by other statutes." Importantly, the UHCDA was adopted *after* the practice of aid in dying entered the public debate, yet the Legislature persisted in refusing to authorize "assisted suicide" to the extent statutorily prohibited elsewhere, which further belies Petitioner's argument that the Legislature did not intend Section 30-2-4 to apply to physician aid in dying. Third, Petitioners contend that in *Baxter*, the Montana Supreme Court relied on that state's public policy protecting patient autonomy in medical decision-making to conclude that aid in dying was not prohibited by Montana's statutory prohibition on assisted suicide, and they urge this Court to do the same. 2009 MT 449, ¶¶ 25-28. However, *Baxter* has little persuasive value in this case because the *Baxter* court merely determined that Montana's statutory consent defense, Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-211 (1977, amended 2015), constituted a complete defense to a charge of homicide for a physician who practiced aid in dying, so long as none of the exceptions to the consent statute applied.[2] 2009 MT 449, ¶ 50. By contrast, our inquiry in this case is different: we must determine whether physician aid in dying could be prosecuted under our state's homicide statutes, a premise which the *Baxter* court apparently assumed. *See id.* ¶ 13. Thus, *Baxter* also does not persuade us to diverge from a plain language interpretation of Section 30-2-4. We therefore conclude that physician aid in dying falls within the proscription of Section 30-2-4.

III. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROTECT THE RIGHT ASSERTED BY PETITIONERS

{17} Because we have determined that Section 30-2-4 could be applied to physician aid in dying, we must now examine Petitioners' constitutional claims. Petitioners contend that application of Section 30-2-4 to physician aid in dying violates the due process provision in Article II, Section 18 and the Inherent Rights Clause in Article II, Section 4 of the New Mexico Constitution. We further note that Petitioners do not assert an equal protection violation before us.[3]

{18} Our state constitution's due process guarantees are analogous to the due process guarantees provided under the United States Constitution. Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law . . . ." The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution similarly provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."

{19} When analyzing a state constitutional provision with a federal analogue, this Court employs the interstitial approach. *State v. Gomez*, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 20, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1. Under the interstitial approach, we must first examine whether an asserted right is protected under an equivalent provision of the United States Constitution. *Id.* ¶ 19. If the right is protected, then, under the New Mexico Constitution, the claim is not reached. *State v. Gomez*, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19. If the right is not protected, then the Court must determine whether "flawed federal analysis, structural differences between state and federal government, or distinctive state characteristics" require a divergence from established federal precedent in determining whether the New Mexico Constitution protects the right. *State v. Gomez*, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19. Although we have the power to "provide *more* liberty than is mandated by the United States Constitution" when interpreting analogous provisions in our own constitution, *Gomez*, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 17, "[t]he burden is on the party seeking relief under the state constitution to provide reasons for interpreting the state provisions differently from the federal provisions when there is no established precedent." *ACLU of N.M. v. City of Albuquerque*, 2006-NMCA-078, ¶ 18, 139 N.M. 761, 137 P.3d 1215.

{20} In *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), the United States Supreme Court answered a similar question to that posed by Petitioners. In *Glucksberg*, three patients in the terminal phases of serious and painful illnesses; four doctors who practiced in Washington, occasionally treated terminally ill patients, and expressed a willingness to assist patients to end their lives if it were legal to do so; and an advocacy group sued, seeking a declaration that the Washington statute that made it a crime to "aid[] another person to attempt suicide," Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060 (1994, amended 2011), was facially unconstitutional. 521 U.S. at 707-08. The *Glucksberg* Court held that, "either on its face or 'as applied to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their doctors,' " the Washington statute did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. *Id.* at 735 (citation omitted).

{21} The *Glucksberg* Court began its analysis by examining the nation's history, legal traditions, and practices. *Id.* at 710. The Court concluded that assisted-suicide bans are deeply rooted in the nation's history and for the most part remain unchanged in the codified laws of the states. *Id.* at 715-16, 719. The Court acknowledged that at the time it was considering the issue, states were engaged in "serious, thoughtful examinations of physician-assisted suicide and other similar issues," *id.* at 719, noting

[2]Petitioners have not raised the issue of whether a physician who provides aid in dying could have a valid common law consent defense to homicide in New Mexico; therefore, we do not address it here. *Cf. State v. Fransua*, 1973-NMCA-071, ¶ 4, 85 N.M. 173, 510 P.2d 106 (holding that New Mexico's common law consent defense was not available for a charge of aggravated battery because our state's battery laws were intended to protect the public from violent acts and to prevent a breach of the public peace).

[3]Petitioners raised an equal protection claim before the district court, but the district court did not address Petitioners' equal protection claim and issued its decision solely on due process grounds. Therefore, an equal protection claim is not properly before us on appeal.

that many states permitted " 'living wills,' surrogate health-care decisionmaking, and the withdrawal or refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment," *id.* at 716 (citation omitted).

{22} The *Glucksberg* Court next turned to the Due Process Clause, inventorying the fundamental rights and liberties not enumerated in the Bill of Rights that are still entitled to heightened protection against government interference:

> In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the "liberty" specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, *Loving v. Virginia*, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); to have children, *Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson*, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942); to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, *Meyer v. Nebraska*, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); to marital privacy, *Griswold v. Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); to use contraception, *ibid.*; *Eisenstadt v. Baird*, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); to bodily integrity, *Rochin v. California*, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), and to abortion, [*Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.*] *Casey*[, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)]. We have also assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment. *Cruzan* [*ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health*, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990)].

Id. at 720.

{23} To avoid transforming liberties protected by the Due Process Clause to the policy preferences of the Court, the *Glucksberg* Court emphasized the importance of requiring parties to give careful descriptions of the asserted fundamental liberty interests to protect the fundamental rights and liberties that objectively are deeply rooted in the nation's history, and are such that neither justice nor liberty would exist if the right were sacrificed. *Id.* at 720-21. This approach was later criticized by the Court in *Obergefell v. Hodges*, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (stating that although the Court's analysis in *Glucksberg*, which defined the right in the "most circumscribed manner, with central reference to specific historical practices," may have been appropriate for the right in that case, it was inconsistent with the Court's approach in discussing "other fundamental rights"). Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, concluded that the *Obergefell* majority opinion jettisoned the careful substantive due process approach announced in *Glucksberg*, effectively overruling the approach. *Obergefell*, ___ U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2620-21 (Roberts, J., dissenting).

{24} The fact remains that the *Glucksberg* Court held that it was not unconstitutional to prohibit doctors from prescribing medication to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths, 521 U.S. at 735, and this holding has never been expressly overruled. The Court reached its holding by defining the right as "a right to commit suicide with another's assistance." *Id.* at 724. The Court concluded that the "almost universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject it today" would require the Court "to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of almost every State," *id.* at 723, something the Court was unwilling to do.

{25} The *Glucksberg* petitioners argued that the liberty interest they pursued was consistent with the general tradition of "self-sovereignty" which included the "basic and intimate exercises of personal autonomy," primarily citing *Cruzan* and *Casey* in support of their argument. *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 724 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In *Cruzan*, the Court assumed that the United States Constitution granted a competent person a "constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." 497 U.S. at 279. However, the right identified in *Cruzan* was based on the history of the law of battery, which is the "touching of one person by another without consent," and the related common law concept of "informed consent [being] generally required for medical treatment." *Id.* at 269, 271-78. In *Casey*, the Court reaffirmed *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and held that a woman has a right to have an abortion before her fetus is viable without undue government interference. *Casey*, 505 U.S. at 846. In so holding, the *Casey* Court stated, "[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State." *Id.* at 851.

{26} The *Glucksberg* Court acknowledged that "many rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy," but emphasized that this does not mean that every important, intimate, and personal decision is so protected. 521 U.S. at 727. The Court concluded that the right to commit suicide with another's assistance "is not a fundamental liberty interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause" because the history of the law has banned and continues to ban assisted suicides. *Id.* at 728. Although the asserted right was not a fundamental liberty interest, the Washington law prohibiting assisted suicides still had to be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. *Id.*

{27} The *Glucksberg* Court articulated several government interests. The first interest is the "unqualified interest in the preservation of human life," regardless of the person's physical or mental condition. *Id.* at 728-29 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The second interest is the "interest in preventing suicide, and in studying, identifying, and treating its causes," particularly since research indicated that if the patient responded to treatment for depression and pain, many patients would withdraw the request for physician aid in dying. *Id.* at 730. The third interest is the "interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession" since the American Medical Association and other medical groups at the time concluded that a physician's aid of a patient in dying was incompatible with the physician's role as a healer. *Id.* at 731. The fourth interest is the "interest in protecting vulnerable groups—including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons—from abuse, neglect, and mistakes" since there was a "real risk of subtle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life situations" and there was a risk that some would resort to physician aid in dying "to spare their families the substantial financial burden of end-of-life health-care costs." *Id.* at 731-32. The fifth and final interest is the legitimate concern that recognizing a

right to physician aid in dying will lead to "broader" interpretations allowing voluntary or involuntary euthanasia because if there is a right, it must be available to everyone, even when a duly appointed surrogate makes the decision, and even when the patient is unable to self-administer the life-ending medication. *Id.* at 732-33.

{28} The *Glucksberg* Court elected not to weigh the varying interests, concluding that each is "unquestionably important and legitimate, and Washington's ban on assisted suicide is at least reasonably related to their promotion and protection." *Id.* at 735. The Court concluded that the "earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality" of physician aid in dying should continue, *see id.*, presumably in the legislative and executive branches of government.

{29} Although the Court held that the Washington law prohibiting assisted suicide did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment "either on its face or as applied to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their doctors," *id.* at 735 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), the Court did not "foreclose the possibility that an individual plaintiff seeking to hasten [his or] her death, or a doctor whose assistance was sought, could prevail in a more particularized challenge," *id.* at 735 n.24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). What would constitute a "more particularized challenge" was not made clear by the Court, other than to suggest that "such a claim would have to be quite different from the ones advanced" in that case, *id.*, leaving a degree of uncertainty as to the extent and steadfastness of its holding.

{30} Justice Stevens, whose special concurrence in *Glucksberg* provoked the majority's concession in footnote 24, offered some insight into why a particularized challenge might result in a different outcome. First, Justice Stevens noted that the three terminally ill patient-plaintiffs in *Glucksberg* died after the district court ruled in their favor, and therefore no individual plaintiff seeking to hasten her death or any doctor threatened with prosecution for assisting in the suicide of a particular patient was before the Court. *Id.* at 739 (Stevens, J., concurring). Accordingly, Justice Stevens agreed that history and tradition did not support "an open-ended constitutional right to commit suicide" or an absolute right to physician aid in dying. *See id.* at 740, 745. However, Justice Stevens noted that *Cruzan* made clear that "some individuals who no longer have the option of deciding whether to live or to die because they are already on the threshold of death have a constitutionally protected interest that may outweigh the State's interest in preserving life at all costs." *Id.* at 745. Thus, a particularized showing might be made by a terminally ill patient who is "faced not with the choice of whether to live, only of how to die," and "who is not victimized by abuse, who is not suffering from depression, and who makes a rational and voluntary decision to seek assistance in dying" after being adequately informed about patient care alternatives. *Id.* at 746-48.

{31} We conclude that *Glucksberg* controls, and therefore that the United States Constitution does not categorically protect Petitioners' asserted right, although an opening remains for a more particularized protection. Having determined that the right Petitioners assert is not protected under the United States Constitution, we now turn to Petitioners' claim that New Mexico's ban on physician aid in dying, as applied to them, violates the due process and inherent rights provisions of the New Mexico Constitution. We may diverge from the *Glucksberg* precedent if we determine that the federal analysis is flawed or that New Mexico has distinct characteristics in the relevant area or that structural differences between our government and the federal government exist. *Gomez*, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19. For the reasons that follow, we choose not to deviate from either the ultimate holding in *Glucksberg* or the suggestion that a more particularized showing might prevail.

IV. THE FEDERAL ANALYSIS SET FORTH IN *GLUCKSBERG* IS NOT FLAWED

{32} The first reason we might depart from *Glucksberg* is if we conclude that the analysis is flawed. Petitioners contend that the *Glucksberg* analysis is flawed for three reasons. They argue that (1) the *Glucksberg* approach to substantive due process has since been abandoned; (2) *Glucksberg* reviewed a facial challenge that did not have the evidence we have today that demonstrates the safety of aid in dying; and (3) *Glucksberg* is in discord with New Mexico's distinct state characteristics.

{33} Petitioners are correct that the *Obergefell* majority took the *Glucksberg* Court to task for defining the right in the most circumscribed manner, referring to historical practices, because the analysis was inconsistent with how other fundamental rights had been defined by the Court. *See Obergefell*, ___ U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. To exemplify its concern, the *Obergefell* majority stated:

> *Loving* did not ask about a right to interracial marriage; *Turner* [*v. Safley*, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)] did not ask about a right of inmates to marry; and *Zablocki* [*v. Redhail*, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)] did not ask about a right of fathers with unpaid child support duties to marry. Rather, each case inquired about the right to marry in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the right.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Despite the Court's criticism of itself, we conclude that the *Glucksberg* approach with respect to physician aid in dying is not flawed. It is much more difficult to define the interest before us—as it was for the *Glucksberg* Court—because unlike *Loving*, *Turner*, *Zablocki*, and *Obergefell*, which had as a tradition the fundamental right to marry with all of the rights, responsibilities, and divorce procedures carefully defined, we do not have such a tradition to fall back on regarding physician aid in dying. Similarly, the *Cruzan* Court interpreted informed consent alongside the statutory prohibition of battery to encompass the right of a competent adult patient to refuse medical treatment. *See* 497 U.S. at 269, 277-79. There is a marked difference between refusing medical treatment, even if doing so will hasten death, and seeking treatment which has for its exclusive purpose the taking of one's life. This was the dichotomy faced by the *Glucksberg* Court. *See* 521 U.S. at 725 ("The decision to commit suicide with the assistance of another may be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection.").

{34} Although this Court might quarrel with the emphasis placed on history and tradition by the *Glucksberg* Court in defining the right, we agree with its analysis concerning legitimate government interests, particularly the following three

interests. First, we agree with the "interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession," *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 731, because the New Mexico Medical Board, for several stated reasons, as of November 2014 had declined to develop any guidelines or standards for aid in dying.[4] Second, we agree with the "interest in protecting vulnerable groups—including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons—from abuse, neglect, and mistakes" since there is a "real risk of subtle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life situations," and there is a risk that some might resort to physician aid in dying "to spare their families the substantial financial burden of end-of-life health-care costs." 521 U.S. at 731-32. Third and perhaps most important, we agree with the legitimate concern that recognizing a right to physician aid in dying will lead to voluntary or involuntary euthanasia because if it is a right, it must be made available to everyone, even when a duly appointed surrogate makes the decision, and even when the patient is unable to self-administer the life-ending medication. *Id.* at 732-33. We therefore determine that the federal analysis set forth in *Glucksberg* is not flawed. This does not end our inquiry. We next determine whether there are distinctive state characteristics contained in Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution that justify a departure from the federal analysis.

V. THERE ARE NO DISTINCTIVE STATE CHARACTERISTICS WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE II, SECTION 18 OF THE NEW MEXICO CONSTITUTION THAT JUSTIFY OUR DEPARTURE FROM *GLUCKSBERG*

{35} Petitioners contend that New Mexico's "long, proud, extraordinary history of respecting patient autonomy and dignity at the end of life" is a distinctive characteristic requiring additional state constitutional protections of the practice of physician aid in dying. In support of this claim, Petitioners point to several New Mexico statutes which they contend demonstrate the New Mexico Legislature's "assiduous respect for the decision-making autonomy of dying patients." First, Petitioners note that New Mexico was the first state to adopt the UHCDA. Pursuant to the UHCDA, patients may provide advance directives to health care providers, including directives to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment and withdraw or withhold artificial nutrition and hydration. *See* §§ 24-7A-1(G), 24-7A-2. Second, Petitioners observe that New Mexico was one of the first three states to recognize advance directives in any form through its 1977 Right to Die Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1977, repealed 1997), which was replaced by the UHCDA. *See* 1997 N.M. Laws, ch. 168. Third, Petitioners point out that the Pain Relief Act protects a patient's right to obtain pain relief, even in situations where death could result. *See* §§ 24-2D-1 to -6.

{36} We agree that the UHCDA, the Right to Die Act, and the Pain Relief Act support the conclusion that New Mexico has historically placed great importance on patient autonomy and dignity in end-of-life decision-making. However, Section 24-7A-13(C) of the UHCDA expressly disavows *assisted suicide*, undercutting Petitioners' assertion that the interests of patient dignity and autonomy protected by the UHCDA also extend to physician aid in dying. Even practices specifically allowed under the UHCDA, such as withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment, must proceed in line with the UHCDA's safeguards, or else health care providers and individuals may be held liable. *See generally* § 24-7A-10. For example, the UHCDA provides safeguards pertaining to the appointment of an agent to carry out a patient's end-of-life directives, § 24-7A-2(A)-(E), end-of-life decisions for unemancipated minors, § 24-7A-6.1, the obligations of a health-care provider after receiving a health-care decision or directive from a patient or a patient's agent, § 24-7A-7, determinations of a patient's capacity with respect to such decisions, § 24-7A-11, and disputes relating to end-of-life decisions, § 24-7A-14. These safeguards illustrate that New Mexico also recognizes, as a companion to the core values of patient dignity and autonomy, that end-of-life decisions are inherently fraught with the potential for abuse and undue influence and that the law should provide positive protections to ensure that patients have made a decision that is both informed and independent. The UHCDA may well provide a road map for future legislators in determining the safeguards that are necessary to implement a form of physician aid in dying, but the statute itself does not support the inference that there is some special characteristic of New Mexico law that makes physician aid in dying a fundamental right in this state. Far from being a distinct characteristic of New Mexico law or a departure from federal law, the UHCDA codifies the right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment that the *Cruzan* Court assumed existed under the United States Constitution. *See* 497 U.S. at 279. Similar safeguards exist under the Pain Relief Act. *See* § 24-2D-3. Neither law provides a sufficient basis to depart from the established federal analysis.

{37} Petitioners next cite both *Protection and Advocacy System* and *State v. Roper*, 1996-NMCA-073, 122 N.M. 126, 921 P.2d 322, to support their contention that New Mexico case law uniquely "reflects distinctive commitment to medical autonomy and respect for human dignity in the provision of medical care." In *Protection and Advocacy System*, our Court of Appeals described the UHCDA as reflecting a policy that "different patients can make markedly different, but still reasonable, choices" regarding end-of-life issues "depending on their religious beliefs, their assessments of the joys of life, their tolerance for pain, their regard for others, and a multitude of other factors." 1999-NMCA-122, ¶ 16. In *Roper*, the Court of Appeals kept confidential a criminal defendant's blood test results, stating that doing so "gives the patient the power

[4]In *Glucksberg*, the American Medical Association concluded that " '[p]hysician-assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as healer.' " 521 U.S. at 731 (alteration in original) (quoting American Medical Association, Code of Ethics § 2.211 (1994)). We note that in New Mexico, as recently as November 2014, the New Mexico Medical Board refused to adopt a standard of care for aid in dying; because there was not a statute in place, some members were concerned that it would be premature to create a standard of care for aid in dying before the Board knew whether it was a legal practice. *See* New Mexico Medical Board, Regular Board Meeting, Nov. 13-14, 2014, Final Minutes at 10, available at their website, http://www.nmmb.state.nm.us (last visited June 29, 2016). The Board minutes further note that the Board was "forced to [establish guidelines] for chronic pain, but that was because there [was] a statute in place, and so unless a law is passed requiring the Medical Board to have oversight of all compassionate end of life assistance, then. . . this was bad for the practice of medicine." *Id.* We therefore appreciate that some members of the medical community understand this to be a legislative issue, and that the question of whether aid in dying is truly an accepted medical practice currently remains the subject of debate within the New Mexico medical community.

to reveal the private information to the persons the patient chooses, reinforcing the [physician-patient] privilege's policy of patient autonomy and privacy." 1996-NMCA-073, ¶ 13. Petitioners also allude to other implied, rather than explicit, fundamental rights recognized by this Court, including the rights of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children, *State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Pamela R.D.G.* (*In re Pamela A.G.*), 2006-NMSC-019, ¶ 11, 139 N.M. 459, 134 P.3d 746; the right to freedom of personal choice in matters of family life, *Jaramillo v. Jaramillo*, 1991-NMSC-101, ¶ 20, 113 N.M. 57, 823 P.2d 299; and the right to familial integrity, *Oldfield v. Benavidez*, 1994-NMSC-006, ¶ 14, 116 N.M. 785, 867 P.2d 1167. According to Petitioners, a competent, terminally ill patient's decision to seek physician aid in dying "is rooted in these already recognized fundamental rights."

{38} The cases cited by Petitioners do not evoke any distinctive characteristics in New Mexico law that require physician aid in dying to be treated as a fundamental right. The language that Petitioners quote from *Protection and Advocacy System* describes the policy behind the UHCDA, which, as previously discussed, explicitly does *not* authorize any form of assisted suicide. Section 24-7A-13(C). *Roper* was decided based on physician-patient privilege and the policy interest in preserving the confidentiality of physician-patient interactions, not, as Petitioners suggest, any special state constitutional interest in patient autonomy and privacy. 1996-NMCA-073, ¶¶ 5-13. Finally, the portions of *Pamela A.G.*, *Jaramillo*, and *Oldfield* cited by Petitioners recognize fundamental liberty interests established by federal law and do not establish any distinct feature of New Mexico law describing an expanded right that might protect physician aid in dying. For these reasons, we conclude that there are no distinctive state characteristics with respect to the due process protections of Article II, Section 18 that warrant a departure from the federal analysis holding that physician aid in dying is not a fundamental right.

VI. PHYSICIAN AID IN DYING IS NOT A FUNDAMENTAL OR IMPORTANT RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE II, SECTION 4 OF THE NEW MEXICO CONSTITUTION

{39} Petitioners also argue that Article II, Section 4 of the New Mexico Constitution is an independent basis on which this Court could hold that there is a fundamental right to physician aid in dying. Article II, Section 4 provides that "[a]ll persons are born equally free, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining safety and happiness." Petitioners contend that, despite being "seldom interpreted" by New Mexico courts, Article II, Section 4 protects "the right for a terminal patient to choose a peaceful, dignified death through aid in dying." Petitioners argue that several opinions of this Court have acknowledged that Article II, Section 4 provides some unique sets of rights, even if the substance of those rights has remained undefined. Petitioners also urge us to give effect to Article II, Section 4 and fulfill our duty to construe our state constitution so that "no part is rendered surplusage or superfluous." *Hannett v. Jones*, 1986-NMSC-047, ¶ 13, 104 N.M. 392, 722 P.2d 643. Finally, Petitioners cite several cases from other states that interpret inherent rights provisions similar to Article II, Section 4 to guarantee rights to liberty in the home and familial protection. *See Stemple v. Herminghouser*, 3 Greene 408, 413 (Iowa 1852) (Greene, J., dissenting); *Hoff v. Berg*, 1999 ND 115, ¶ 10, 595 N.W.2d 285, 289 (N.D. 1999).

{40} To ascertain the meaning of Article II, Section 4, we first examine the historical "milieu" from which this provision emerged in an effort to shed light on how the framers of our state constitution may have viewed it. *See State v. Gutierrez*, 1993-NMSC-062, ¶¶ 33-35, 116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052 (reviewing the historical emergence of Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution to determine its "scope, meaning, and effect"). The language in Article II, Section 4 most likely originated from the natural rights provision in the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights, codified in Article I, Section 1 of the Virginia Constitution. Marshall J. Ray, *What Does the Natural Rights Clause Mean to New Mexico?*, 39 N.M. L. Rev. 375, 395 (2009). Similar guarantees of inherent or inalienable rights to life, liberty, property, and seeking or pursuing and obtaining happiness have since been incorporated into a variety of state constitutions,[5] and similar language most famously appears in the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence. In recent years, scholars have puzzled over the intended meaning and scope of such "natural rights clauses" and divined a variety of possible influences, from Aristotle to John Locke, without coming to any definitive conclusions as to whether provisions such as Article II, Section 4 were originally intended to give rise to judicially enforceable rights, or were simply intended to set forth the general aspirations of government. *See* Linda M. Keller, *The American Rejection of Economic Rights as Human Rights & the Declaration of Independence: Does the Pursuit of Happiness Require Basic Economic Rights?*, 19 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 557, 564-78, 598-605 (2003); Joseph R. Grodin, *Rediscovering the State Constitutional Right to Happiness and Safety*, 25 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1, 11-19 (1997).

{41} State court jurisprudence on natural rights clauses up until the New Mexico Constitution was drafted can be conceptualized under two broad "themes." *See* Ray, *supra*, at 390-94. First, most jurisdictions undertook a balancing test to weigh the exercise of the natural right against the State's inherent power to regulate public health, morals, and welfare. *Id.* at 391 n.111 (listing cases). Second, other jurisdictions viewed natural rights provisions as codifying the common law maxim, *"Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas"* (use your property in such a manner as not to injure that of another), which recognizes that "the natural rights clause would invalidate legislation adversely affecting personal liberty and happiness unless the[] exercise [of personal liberty or happiness] in some way harms or presents an actual

[5]For example, provisions recognizing the inherent right to seek and obtain happiness and safety appear in the constitutions of Iowa (Iowa Const. art. I, § 1); California (Cal. Const. art. I, § 1) (amended in 1972 to include a right to privacy); Colorado (Colo. Const. art. II, § 3); Idaho (Idaho Const. art. I, § 1) (recognizing the right to pursue happiness and seek safety); Massachusetts (Mass. Const. Pt. I, art. 1); Nevada (Nev. Const. art. I, § 1); New Hampshire (N.H. Const. Pt. 1, art. 2) (recognizing the right to seek and obtain happiness); New Jersey (N.J. Const. art. I, § 1); North Dakota (N.D. Const. art. I, § 1) (amended in 1984 to include right to bear arms); Ohio (Ohio Const. art. I, § 1); Vermont (Vt. Const. Ch. I, art. 1); and West Virginia (W. Va. Const. art. III, § 1). Other state constitutions similarly guarantee "the pursuit of happiness" as a natural or inherent right. *See* Joseph R. Grodin, *Rediscovering the State Constitutional Right to Happiness and Safety*, 25 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1, 3-4 (1997) (citing examples).

and substantial risk of harm to another person." *Id.* at 391-94. However, historical interpretations of natural rights provisions provide "no conclusive evidence" as to the purpose and effect that those who drafted the New Mexico Constitution may have envisioned for Article II, Section 4. *See* Ray, *supra*, at 394.

{42} Adding to the ambiguous history of these provisions, some of the earliest cases interpreting state constitutional natural rights clauses assumed that they protected a wide variety of individual rights against state action. For example, at least five states relied on the guarantee of their natural rights provisions that all men are born equally free to declare slavery unconstitutional. *See* Steven G. Calabresi & Sofia M. Vickery, *On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees*, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1299, 1328-46 (2015) (describing cases). Similarly, the Maine Supreme Court relied on the natural rights provision contained in the Maine Constitution to hold that Native Americans living in Maine could enter into valid contracts, *Murch v. Tomer*, 21 Me. 535, 537 (1842), and that African-Americans could be citizens of Maine, *Op. of the Supreme Judicial Court*, 44 Me. 507, 515-16 (1857), and had a right to vote, *Op. of Judge Appleton*, 44 Me. 521, 522 (1857). Further, in one of the only cases to assume an affirmative right to pursue happiness, the Indiana Supreme Court held that a state prohibition law was unconstitutional because it violated "natural rights" preserved by the Indiana Constitution, including "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." *Herman v. State*, 8 Ind. 545, 556, 567 (1855). The *Herman* court conceived of these rights in the context of economic liberty, including "pursuing trade and business for the acquisition of property, and . . . pursuing our happiness in using [our liberty]," and held that Indiana's legislature could not take away an individual's right to freely select what to eat or drink. *Id.* at 557-59; *cf. Sheppard v. Dowling*, 28 So. 791, 795 -96 (Ala. 1900) (upholding as constitutional a statute regulating dispensary of liquor and stating, "[p]ursuit of happiness is one of the citizen's inalienable rights. But the lines of such pursuit are not unlimited. A man's chief joy may be in the death of his enemy, yet the law does not allow him to pursue happiness in that direction.").

{43} Modern courts have arrived at differing conclusions as to whether these provisions create judicially enforceable rights and the meaning of those rights. For example, federal courts do not recognize any independent cause of action arising from the natural rights guarantee in the Declaration of Independence, which they instead regard as "a statement of ideals, not law." *Swepi, LP v. Mora Cty., N.M.*, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1172 (D.N.M. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); *see also Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Declaration of Independence, however, is not a legal prescription conferring powers upon the courts . . . ."); *Coffey v. United States*, 939 F. Supp. 185, 190-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (concluding that the plaintiff had failed to state a legal cause of action when he claimed a violation of his right to pursue happiness because the Declaration of Independence does not create judicially enforceable rights). Although natural rights provisions in state constitutions are guarantees, unlike the rights announced by the Declaration of Independence, some state courts have followed the federal example and interpreted constitutional natural rights provisions as merely aspirational and not subject to judicial enforcement. *See, e.g.*, *Sepe v. Daneker*, 68 A.2d 101, 105 (R.I. 1949) (confirming language in the Rhode Island Constitution's due process and equal protection provision stating that "[a]ll free governments are instituted for the protection, safety and happiness of the people" was merely advisory and did not give rise to a judicially enforceable right (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{44} By contrast, some states, such as Iowa, treat their natural rights clauses as granting judicially enforceable rights. *See Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C.*, 684 N.W.2d 168, 176 (Iowa 2004) (stating that "the constitutional protection embodied in Iowa's Inalienable Rights Clause is not a mere glittering generality without substance or meaning," but is instead "intended to secure citizens' pre-existing common law rights (sometimes known as 'natural rights') from unwarranted government restrictions" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). However, those cases generally acknowledge that natural rights provisions do not codify absolute or fundamental rights, but instead recognize that natural rights are still subject to reasonable regulation by the state in the exercise of its police power. *See id.*; *see also Concerned Dog Owners of Cal. v. City of Los Angeles*, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 774, 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (liberties enumerated in the Natural Rights Clause in the California Constitution are circumscribed by the requirements of public health and safety and are generally subject to reasonable regulation). Other modern court decisions have interpreted constitutional natural rights provisions to protect privacy and personal liberty. *See Commonwealth v. Wasson*, 842 S.W.2d 487, 494-99, 501-502 (Ky. 1992) (striking down a law prohibiting private sexual acts based on a right of privacy emanating from Kentucky's natural rights provision); *In re Quinlan*, 355 A.2d 647, 663-64 (N.J. 1976) (determining that New Jersey's natural rights provision guarantees a right of privacy); *Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist*, 38 S.W.3d 1, 4, 13 (Tenn. 2000) (determining that a fundamental right of privacy arising from Tennessee's natural rights provision, among others, required strict scrutiny review of certain abortion restrictions); *but cf. Benning v. State*, 641 A.2d 757, 761 (Vt. 1994) (rejecting existence of a broad constitutional "right to be let alone" in Vermont's natural rights provision).

{45} Similar to the cases from Iowa and California discussed above, the earliest New Mexico cases analyzed Article II, Section 4 in the context of economic and property rights and balanced an individual's inherent rights against the state's general powers to regulate and to protect the public. In *State v. Brooken*, 1914-NMSC-075, ¶¶ 1, 12-14, 17, 19 N.M. 404, 143 P. 479, the first case to discuss Article II, Section 4, this Court upheld a law that prohibited, with limited exceptions, interfering with the freedom of unaccompanied cattle under the age of seven months. The challenger in that case claimed, in part, that enforcement of the law violated his "constitutional right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property" by preventing him from holding calves under herd. *Brooken*, 1914-NMSC-075, ¶ 8. We clarified that, under its police power, the Legislature could "provide reasonable regulations for the use and enjoyment of property" when such regulations were necessary "for the common good and the protection of others." *Id.* ¶¶ 9, 13; *see also Otero v. Zouhar*, 1984-NMCA-054, ¶ 43, 102 N.M. 493, 697 P.2d 493 (holding, without further explanation, that "inherent and inalienable rights to acquire property" under Article II, Section 4 "are not absolute, but subject to reasonable regulation"), *aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds by Otero v. Zouhar*, 1985-NMSC-021, 102 N.M. 482, 697 P.2d 482, *overruled on other grounds by Grantland v. Lea Reg'l Hosp.,*

Inc., 1990-NMSC-076, 110 N.M. 378, 796 P.2d 599.

{46} In recent years, New Mexico courts have invoked Article II, Section 4 as a prism through which we view due process and equal protection guarantees. For example, in *California First Bank v. State*, we recognized in dicta that Article II, Section 4 should not be given the same breadth as the Due Process Clause in the United States Constitution because of the specificity of the rights in Article II, Section 4. 1990-NMSC-106, ¶ 44, 111 N.M. 64, 801 P.2d 646. In that case, we reasoned that unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, "Article II, Section 4 expressly guarantees the right 'of seeking and obtaining safety,' " and thus, in "interpreting the more expansive language of Article II, Section 4," courts should be "mindful of the more intimate relationship existing between a state government and its people, as well as the more expansive role states traditionally have played in keeping and maintaining the peace within their borders." *Cal. First Bank*, 1990-NMSC-106, ¶ 44. Yet *California First Bank* expressly did not address which specific protections are provided by Article II, Section 4, and it expressly did not elaborate on whether a violation of this provision alone could ever give rise to a cause of action. *Cal. First Bank*, 1990-NMSC-106, ¶ 45.

{47} We took our dicta from *California First Bank* one step further by incorporating Article II, Section 4 as a central component of our due process analysis in *Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz*. *See* 1997-NMSC-055, ¶¶ 101-05, 124 N.M. 129, 947 P.2d 86, *rev'd*, *New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed*, 524 U.S. 151 (1998). Reed was a criminal justice activist and former prisoner who fled Ohio and ended up in Taos, New Mexico. *Id.* ¶¶ 3-4, 9-10, 29-30. When the Governor of Ohio sought to extradite Reed and Reed was arrested by authorities in New Mexico, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to challenge the constitutionality of his arrest. *Id.* ¶ 35. We affirmed the district court's grant of habeas corpus and held that Reed was not a "fugitive from justice," and thus did not qualify for extradition under the factors set forth in *Michigan v. Doran*, 439 U.S. 282 (1978). *Reed*, 1997-NMSC-055, ¶¶ 1, 40, 44, 126. The U.S. Supreme Court later issued a short per curiam opinion reversing our ruling, disavowing this Court's reliance on Reed's claims to determine that he was not a fugitive, and ordering that Reed be extradited because this Court's inquiry "went beyond the permissible inquiry in an extradition case, and permitted the litigation of issues not open in the asylum State." *New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz*, 524 U.S. at 155. However, our discussion of Article II, Section 4 remains instructive because the United States Supreme Court opinion did not affect our interpretation of that provision.

{48} Having determined that Reed was not a fugitive, we viewed his due process rights through the lens of his right to seek and obtain safety under Article II, Section 4. *Reed*, 1997-NMSC-055, ¶¶ 101-05. We observed that Article II, Section 4 guarantees the enjoyment of life and liberty as a natural, inherent, and inalienable right, and "accords the same value to the right 'of seeking and obtaining safety and happiness.' " *Reed*, 1997-NMSC-055, ¶ 102 (quoting N.M. Const., art. II, § 4). We explained that in the extraordinary circumstances of Reed's case—namely that there was undisputed evidence that Ohio officials would deprive Reed of his liberty, and possibly even his life, without due process—"the New Mexico Constitution requires the protection of [Reed's] life and safety." *Reed*, 1997-NMSC-055, ¶ 103 (citing N.M. Const., art. II, §§ 4, 18). We acknowledged that New Mexico courts "have not fully defined the scope of [Article II, Section 4]," but reasoned that "it certainly applies to individuals like Reed who were threatened with death or great bodily harm by government officials of another state, and who had no recourse or remedy within that threatening state." *Reed*, 1997-NMSC-055, ¶ 105. We concluded that Article II, Section 4 created "a more expansive guarantee of obtaining safety" than the guarantee under the United States Constitution. *Reed*, 1997-NMSC-055, ¶ 105 (internal quotation marks omitted).

> Reed faced the deprivation of his life without due process of law if he had remained in Ohio. The New Mexico Constitution cannot tolerate such an outcome. NM Const. art. II, §§ 4 & 18. Moreover, Reed was precluded from seeking safety in Ohio. . . . He fled to New Mexico for the express purpose of finding safety. For this reason, Reed properly comes under the protection of Article II, Section 4 of the New Mexico Constitution which guarantees the right "of seeking and obtaining safety." Reed did not flee from justice. He sought refuge from injustice.

Reed, 1997-NMSC-055, ¶ 124.

{49} Recently in *Griego*, we quoted Article II, Section 4 before examining equal protection under its lens. *See* 2014-NMSC-003, ¶ 1; *cf. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis*, 165 U.S. 150, 160 (1897) ("[I]t is always safe to read the letter of the constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence. No duty rests more imperatively upon the courts than the enforcement of those constitutional provisions intended to secure that equality of rights which is the foundation of free government."). Without question, Article II, Section 4 informed our analysis in *Griego* because marriage, which is a deeply personal human relationship, can be important to the enjoyment of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and important to the protection of property interests. *See, e.g.*, 2014-NMSC-003, ¶¶ 1, 4. However, Article II, Section 4 did not create the marital relationship at issue in *Griego*; civil marriage was a historical right created by the Legislature. *See* 2014-NMSC-003, ¶¶ 20-23. We interpreted the existing marriage laws to have as their purpose bringing "stability and order to the legal relationship of committed couples by defining their rights and responsibilities as to one another, their children if they choose to raise children together, and their property." *Id.* ¶ 6. The question was whether the Legislature could constitutionally deprive committed same-gender couples from "entering into a purely secular civil marriage and securing the accompanying rights, protections, and responsibilities of New Mexico laws" granted to opposite-gender couples, *id.* ¶ 3, when the disparity in treatment of these groups was viewed in the context of Article II, Section 4, *id.* ¶ 1. However, as in *Reed*, *Griego* did not construe Article II, Section 4 as an enforceable independent source of individual rights, but rather as an overarching principle which informed the equal protection guarantee of our Constitution. *See generally* 2014-NMSC-003.

{50} We have also declined to interpret Article II, Section 4 as creating a right to full recovery in tort actions. *See, e.g.*, *Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque*, 1990-NMSC-083, ¶¶ 22-23, 110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571 (stating that Article II, Section 4 does not afford more protection to victims of governmental torts than do the provisions of Article II, Section 18), *overruled by Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque*, 1998-NMSC-031, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305; *Richardson v.*

Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 1988-NMSC-084, ¶ 29, 107 N.M. 688, 763 P.2d 1133 (declining to interpret Article II Section 4 "as implicitly guaranteeing a fundamental right to full recovery in tort actions"), *overruled by Trujillo*, 1998-NMSC-031.

{51} No New Mexico case provides any meaningful support to Petitioners' claim that Article II, Section 4 establishes a fundamental right "for a terminal patient to choose a peaceful, dignified death through aid in dying." Although Article II, Section 4 should inform our understanding of New Mexico's equal protection guarantee, *see Griego*, 2014-NMSC-003, ¶ 1, and may also ultimately be a source of greater due process protections than those provided under federal law, *see Cal. First Bank*, 1990-NMSC-106, ¶ 44, the Inherent Rights Clause has never been interpreted to be the exclusive source for a fundamental or important constitutional right, and on its own has always been subject to reasonable regulation. Therefore, Petitioners have not established a fundamental or important right to aid in dying under Article II, Section 4.

VII. THERE IS A RATIONAL BASIS FOR THE SECTION 30-2-4 PROHIBITION OF PHYSICIAN AID IN DYING

{52} Although we do not recognize a fundamental or important right to physician aid in dying, Section 30-2-4 must still be rationally related to legitimate government interests to be constitutional as applied to physician aid in dying. *See Wagner v. AGW Consultants*, 2005-NMSC-016, ¶¶ 24, 25, 29, 31, 137 N.M. 734, 114 P.3d 1050. We respectfully acknowledge the magnitude and importance of the very personal desire of a terminally ill patient to decide how to safely and peacefully exit a painful and debilitating life. The personal autonomy to make one's own medical decisions, even those that can hasten one's own death, are recognized in the UHCDA and the Pain Relief Act, which provide numerous safeguards to protect the integrity of those decisions. The State concedes that it does not have an interest in preserving a painful and debilitating life that will end imminently. However, the State does have a legitimate interest in providing positive protections to ensure that a terminally ill patient's end-of-life decision is informed, independent, and procedurally safe.

{53} Petitioners rely on the statutory schemes in other states to guide the discussion of who would qualify for physician aid in dying. Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, the basis for the standard of care guiding Dr. Kress's practice, sets forth detailed guidelines and procedural protections that doctors must follow to legally provide this option to their terminally ill patients. To be eligible for aid in dying, the patient must be an adult, be suffering from a terminal disease, be an in-state resident, and have "voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die." *See* Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.805(1). "Terminal disease" is defined as an incurable and irreversible disease that "will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six months." *Id.* § 127.800(12). On behalf of Petitioners, Dr. Gideonse testified that doctors are accustomed to determining to a reasonable medical certainty whether a patient has less than six months to live because that prognosis is already required to place a patient into hospice care. In other words, a terminal diagnosis is not a feature unique to aid in dying. To be eligible, the patient must also have been judged "capable," which means that in the opinion of the patient's attending physician, a court, or the patient's psychiatrist, the patient "has the ability to make and communicate health care decisions . . . including communication through persons familiar with the patient's manner of communicating." *See id.* § 127.800(3). There is no legal requirement that doctors in Oregon provide aid in dying to a qualifying patient, and individual health care providers can explicitly prohibit the practice. *Id.* § 127.885(4)- (5).

{54} Further, under the Oregon statute, two physicians must separately determine the patient's eligibility for aid in dying. *See id.* § 127.820. Dr. Kress gave an example where he sought the opinion of five other physicians who had treated a patient—a gastroenterologist, an oncologist, a surgeon, a radiologist, and a family medicine physician—as to whether the patient was terminally ill. If any examining physician determines that the patient is suffering from impaired judgment due to depression or a psychological disorder, that physician must refer the patient to counseling, and no physician can prescribe a lethal dose to the patient. *See id.* § 127.825. Indeed, Dr. Kress testified that under the proper standard of care, he will not prescribe a lethal dose unless the patient is "clear and assertive" in requesting aid in dying. Additionally, Dr. Gideonse testified that doctors often make judgments regarding a patient's competency to make important medical decisions, and the aid in dying situation is not significantly different. The patient must also be informed of (a) his or her medical diagnosis; (b) his or her prognosis; (c) the potential risks associated with the fatal dose of medication; (d) the probable result of taking the medication, which usually results in a loss of consciousness and death within minutes; and (e) feasible alternatives including hospice care, comfort care, and pain control. *See id.* §§ 127.800(7), 127.830. In sum, it is apparent that the right described by Petitioners and, by extension, the standard of care essential to that right, has been thoroughly defined through legislation in states such as Oregon, where physician aid in dying is legal.

{55} The *Obergefell* Court concluded that defining rights in their most comprehensive sense is the correct approach for the federal substantive due process analysis. ___ U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2602-03. Far from defining the asserted right in this case, i.e., the right to a physician's aid in dying, in its comprehensive sense through judicial ruling, it is clear to us that such a right cannot be defined without comprehensive legislation.

{56} New Mexico, like the rest of the nation, has historically sought to deter suicides and to punish those who assist with suicide, with limited exceptions in the UHCDA and the Pain Relief Act. However, these exceptions occurred as a result of debates in the legislative and executive branches of government, and only because of carefully drafted definitions and safeguards, which incidentally are consistent with the safeguards urged by Petitioners. Numerous examples of such definitions and safeguards exist in the UHCDA. In addition to those previously identified in paragraph 35 of this opinion, the following reflect other safeguards relevant to our analysis. "Life-sustaining treatment" is specifically defined. Section 24-7A-1(K). An insurer is prohibited from conditioning the sale of insurance on the execution of an advance health care directive. Section 24-7A-2.1(B). A health care provider cannot condition the provision of health care to the patient on the patient signing or revoking a health care directive. Section 24-7A-7(H). A health care provider may decline to comply with a health care decision "for reasons of conscience," but must treat the patient and make reasonable efforts to transfer the patient to a provider who is willing to comply with the patient's directive. Section 24-7A-7(E), (G). The patient or his or her agent, surrogate, or guardian may petition a court

to enjoin or authorize a health care directive. Section 24-7A-14. These and other provisions of the UHCDA further many of the government interests recognized by the *Glucksberg* Court as unquestionably legitimate, and which made Washington's ban on physician aid in dying reasonably related to their promotion and protection. *See Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 728-35. Indeed, if such exceptions and carve-outs to the historical national public policy of deterring suicide properly exist, they are certainly borne of the legislature and not the judiciary.

{57} In *Trujillo*, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 27, 30, 32, we adopted a rational basis test different than the federal rational basis test. This test requires the challenger to demonstrate that the legislation is not supported by a firm legal rationale or evidence in the record. *Wagner*, 2005-NMSC-016, ¶ 24. We are persuaded that end-of-life decisions are inherently fraught with the potential for abuse and undue influence as evidenced by the protections outlined in the UHCDA and the Pain Relief Act, and therefore the government interests we have identified, similar to those in *Glucksberg*, are supported by a firm legal rationale. Applying this to Petitioners' challenge, we conclude that there is a firm legal rationale behind (1) the interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession; (2) the interest in protecting vulnerable groups—including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons—from abuse, neglect, and mistakes due to the real risk of subtle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life situations or the desire of some to resort to physician aid in dying to spare their families the substantial financial burden of end-of-life health care costs; and (3) the legitimate concern that recognizing a right to physician aid in dying will lead to voluntary or involuntary euthanasia because if it is a right, it must be made available to everyone, even when a duly appointed surrogate makes the decision, and even when the patient is unable to self-administer the life-ending medication. *See* 521 U.S. at 731-33; Part III, ¶ 27, *supra*. Petitioners nonetheless maintain that the *Glucksberg* Court either did not have the same evidence before it that we do today, including data from several states and established practices in those states, and therefore concerns addressed in *Glucksberg* are no longer valid, or never came to fruition. However, in New Mexico these very concerns are addressed in the UHCDA, which was most recently amended in 2015, indicating not only the desirability of legislation in areas such as aid in dying, but also reflecting legitimate and ongoing legal rationales that *Glucksberg* raised nearly twenty years ago which endure today. Although it is unlawful in New Mexico to assist someone in committing suicide, the exceptions contained within the UHCDA and the Pain Relief Act narrow the statute's application, provided that physicians comply with the rigorous requirements of each act. Therefore, when the relevant legislation is read as a whole, Section 30-2-4 is rationally related to the aforementioned legitimate government interests. If we were to recognize an absolute, fundamental right to physician aid in dying, constitutional questions would abound regarding legislation that defined terminal illness or provided for protective procedures to assure that a patient was making an informed and independent decision. Regulation in this area is essential, given that if a patient carries out his or her end-of-life decision it cannot be reversed, even if it turns out that the patient did not make the decision of his or her own free will.

VIII. CONCLUSION

{58} Pursuant to New Mexico's heightened rational basis analysis, and based on the record before us and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that although physician aid in dying falls within the proscription of Section 30-2-4, this statute is neither unconstitutional on its face nor as it is applied to Petitioners. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's contrary conclusion and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

{59} IT IS SO ORDERED.

EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice

WE CONCUR:
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice
JAMES M. HUDSON, District Judge
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